Understanding Donor-Advised Funds: The Behavioral Economics, Macroeconomics, And Public Policies Relating To An Emerging Trend In Philanthropy by Heist, H. Daniel
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2019
Understanding Donor-Advised Funds: The
Behavioral Economics, Macroeconomics, And
Public Policies Relating To An Emerging Trend In
Philanthropy
H. Daniel Heist
University of Pennsylvania, hdheist@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Public Administration Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3346
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Heist, H. Daniel, "Understanding Donor-Advised Funds: The Behavioral Economics, Macroeconomics, And Public Policies Relating
To An Emerging Trend In Philanthropy" (2019). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 3346.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3346
Understanding Donor-Advised Funds: The Behavioral Economics,
Macroeconomics, And Public Policies Relating To An Emerging Trend In
Philanthropy
Abstract
Donor-advised funds (DAFs) are changing the mode of philanthropy in the United States. The lack of
research on DAFs leaves nonprofit managers and policymakers with little empirical evidence or theoretical
framework. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide scholarly research about why people use DAFs, how
they function within the nonprofit economy, and what public policies may most effectively address public
concerns. To this end, the dissertation is a combination of three peer-reviewed scholarly articles covering
these topics. The first article tests behavioral economic concepts relating to charitable giving that help to
explain why people use DAFs. The results showed that lower prices of giving lead to increases in charitable
giving amounts and that increases in agency lead to higher participation rates in giving. The second article
addresses how money flows through DAFs to other charities, and how this grantmaking is affected by
macroeconomic factors. The study uses a panel data set of about one thousand DAF sponsors over a ten-year
period, and merges this data with four macroeconomic factors. The findings suggest that money flows
relatively quickly through DAFs to other nonprofits, and that giving out of DAFs is more resilient to recession
economies than other forms of charitable giving. The third article reviews the public policy debates around
donor-advised funds and makes public policy recommendations. The paper starts by reviewing the three
major policy issues with DAFs: 1) the timing of donations and tax deductions, 2) transparency issues, and 3)
the costs to the federal government. After analyzing current proposals within a historical context, the paper
makes recommendations designed for the best interest of the nonprofit sector as a whole. The dissertation as a
whole represents a seminal effort to conduct empirical research on donor-advised funds to better understand
them and provide a theoretical framework for public policy.
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group
Social Welfare
First Advisor
Ram A. Cnaan
Keywords
Charitable Giving, Donor-Advised Fund, Philanthropy
Subject Categories
Public Administration | Social and Behavioral Sciences
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3346
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3346
 
 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS: 
THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, MACROECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC 
POLICIES RELATING TO AN EMERGING TREND IN PHILANTHROPY 
 
H. Daniel Heist 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
in 
 
Social Welfare 
 
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania  
 
in  
 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
2019 
Supervisor of Dissertation     
_____________________________     
Ram Cnaan, MSW, PhD, Professor, School of Social Policy and Practice 
 
Graduate Group Chairperson 
_____________________________    
Femida Handy, PhD, Professor, School of Social Policy and Practice 
 
Dissertation Committee: 
Ram Cnaan, MSW, PhD, Professor, School of Social Policy and Practice 
Femida Handy, Professor, School of Social Policy and Practice 
John DiIulio, PhD, Professor, School of Arts and Sciences, Political Science Department 
Michael Rovine, PhD, Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Education 
	 ii	
 
 
Dedication: 
 
This work is dedicated to my wife Katie, and our five children Autumn, Harry, Lucy, 
Kate, and Eliza (who was born during the writing of the dissertation), for all of their love 
and support, and for helping me to remember what is really important. 
 
 
  
	 iii	
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 I would like to recognize my advisor Dr. Ram Cnaan, who was a guiding force 
through this work, and the rest of my committee Drs. Femida Handy, John DiIulio, and 
Mike Rovine, who made invaluable insights and provided support. I would like to 
recognize Eileen Heisman for her support and mentorship. I am grateful to Danielle 
Vance-McMullen, my co-author on the second article, for providing quantitative 
expertise and adroit attention to detail. I would also like to thank the several editors and 
referees who reviewed this work for their valuable feedback and direct. 
  
	 iv	
ABSTRACT 
UNDERSTANDING DONOR-ADVISED FUNDS: 
THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, MACROECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC 
POLICIES RELATING TO AN EMERGING TREND IN PHILANTHROPY 
 
H. Daniel Heist 
 
Ram A. Cnaan, PhD 
 
Donor-advised funds (DAFs) are changing the mode of philanthropy in the United States. 
The lack of research on DAFs leaves nonprofit managers and policymakers with little 
empirical evidence or theoretical framework. The purpose of this dissertation is to 
provide scholarly research about why people use DAFs, how they function within the 
nonprofit economy, and what public policies may most effectively address public 
concerns. To this end, the dissertation is a combination of three peer-reviewed scholarly 
articles covering these topics. The first article tests behavioral economic concepts relating 
to charitable giving that help to explain why people use DAFs. The results showed that 
lower prices of giving lead to increases in charitable giving amounts and that increases in 
agency lead to higher participation rates in giving. The second article addresses how 
money flows through DAFs to other charities, and how this grantmaking is affected by 
macroeconomic factors. The study uses a panel data set of about one thousand DAF 
sponsors over a ten-year period, and merges this data with four macroeconomic factors. 
The findings suggest that money flows relatively quickly through DAFs to other 
nonprofits, and that giving out of DAFs is more resilient to recession economies than 
other forms of charitable giving. The third article reviews the public policy debates 
around donor-advised funds and makes public policy recommendations. The paper starts 
by reviewing the three major policy issues with DAFs:  1) the timing of donations and tax 
	 v	
deductions, 2) transparency issues, and 3) the costs to the federal government. After 
analyzing current proposals within a historical context, the paper makes 
recommendations designed for the best interest of the nonprofit sector as a whole. The 
dissertation as a whole represents a seminal effort to conduct empirical research on 
donor-advised funds to better understand them and provide a theoretical framework for 
public policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Donor-advised funds (DAFs) are changing American philanthropy as we know it. 
Nothing since the advent of private foundations has changed the way that money is 
voluntarily redistributed through sanctioned charitable organizations so profoundly than 
the proliferation of donor-advised funds. A half-a-million Americans now give their 
charitable donation through a “giving account” held by a philanthropic intermediary, 
know as a donor-advised fund sponsor, and the number of users is increasing rapidly. 
More than 10% of all individual giving is now going through DAFs instead of directly to 
charities, and DAF sponsors hold over $110 Billion in Assets designated for charitable 
purposes (National Philanthropic Trust, 2018) The largest DAFs now rival the largest 
private foundations and the largest nonprofit corporations. But we do not know a lot 
about DAFs, because the data on DAFs is difficult to collect, and the usage of DAFs is 
not well understood. As a result, much of the conversations and debates around DAFs are 
informed by anecdotal evidence or summary statistics. This dissertation work constitutes 
some of the first scientific treatments of this emerging and increasingly influential form 
of philanthropy. 
Understanding the underlying decision making that drives donor-advised fund 
growth is an important element to an analytical approach to the subject. The field of 
behavioral economics offers both economic and psychological constructs that have been 
applied to the understanding of philanthropic behavior (List, 2011). Donor-advised funds 
help donors to maximize deductions for charitable giving, and allow them a lot of 
flexibility for how and when to give charitable donations. By maximizing tax deductions, 
donor-advised funds effectively reduce the price of giving for many donors. By 
	 2	
increasing flexibility, donor-advised funds increase the agency of donors. Given the 
limited access to donor-advised fund users, this dissertation starts by analyzing the 
concepts of price and agency within a donative situation, by using online experiments. 
Evidence for the effects of price and agency with online workers helps us begin to 
understand some of the behavioral decisions being made by donor-advised fund users. 
It is also important to understand how donor-advised funds function on the macro 
level. Every year DAFs report some very simple metrics to the IRS about the amount of 
money that they received (contributions) , the amount of money they have (assets), and 
the amount of money they gave away (grants). By tracking these metrics over ten years, 
using a panel of one thousand DAF sponsors, this dissertation is able to provide insightful 
analyses on how money moves through DAFs over time. The article also looks at the 
various types and sizes of sponsors within the panel. We find that different types and 
sizes of DAF sponsors have different patterns of the flow of money over time. When 
compared to macroeconomic indicators, we also find some interesting patterns. We see 
that grant money coming out of DAFs does drop slightly in recessions, but not nearly as 
much as the decrease in assets or contributions. These findings suggest that giving out of 
DAFs is resilient to downward shocks in the economy and may have important 
implications for how policy makers choose to regulate DAFs in the future. 
The question about regulating DAFs has been a hot topic in philanthropic 
periodicals and other popular news journals. The current treatment of donor-advised 
funds under law allows them a wide degree of freedom, which is in part the reason for 
their meteoric growth. Several reform advocates have suggested that more stringent 
policies be imposed upon donor-advised funds sponsors to ensure the best interests of the 
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public sector. While well intentioned, many of the critiques and proposed regulations do 
not account for the underlying principles of behavioral economics, nor the empirical 
evidence of the economic analyses presented in this dissertation. Based on a deeper 
understanding of donor-advised funds, the last part of this dissertation reviews the 
various policy issues relating to DAFs. Considering these issues in a historical context of 
how government has traditionally regulated nonprofit and philanthropic activity, the 
article provides a balanced approach to future regulation. Several policies are proposed 
with the intention of maintaining the maximum freedom for donor-advised fund sponsors 
and users, while safeguarding public trust in nonprofits and philanthropy. These policies 
are designed to avoid unintended consequences and for the best interest of the nonprofit 
sector as a whole. 
  
	 4	
 
Article 1. 
Price and Agency Effects on Charitable Giving Behavior 
published in 2018 in Journal of Behavioral Economics and Experiments 
 
Authors: 
H. Daniel Heist (Corresponding author) 
Affiliation: University of Pennsylvania, School of Social Policy and Practice 
Address: 3815 Walnut St. Philadelphia, PA 19104.  
Phone: 1-801-414-3018  Email: heist@sp2.upenn.edu 
 
Bio: Mr. Heist is a PhD candidate at the University of 
Pennsylvania, School of Social Policy and Practice. He has a 
Master’s degree in Philanthropic Studies from the Lilly Family 
School of Philanthropy at Indiana University. His research 
explores pro-social behavior, including charitable giving and 
volunteering. 
 
 
 
 
 
Ram A. Cnaan  
Affiliation: University of Pennsylvania, School of Social Policy and Practice 
Address: 3701 Locust Walk, Caster Building, Room D-20, Philadelphia, PA 19104–
6243. 
Phone: 215.898.5523 Fax: 215.573.2099 Email: cnaan@sp2.upenn.edu 
 
Bio: Dr. Cnaan is a Professor and Director, Program for Religion and 
Social Policy Research at the University of Pennsylvania, School of 
Social Policy & Practice. He is the founder and Faculty Director the 
Goldring Reentry Initiative which works to reduce recidivism. He is 
also a Global Eminent Scholar at Kyung Hee University Graduate 
Institute of Peace, South Korea.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
	 5	
Abstract 
 
 Charitable giving challenges our understanding of human behavior; it benefits 
others yet is guided by personal preferences. This study uses online experiments to test 
how donors respond to circumstantial conditions in donative behavior. We vary two 
factors, the amount of agency and the price of giving, to test how these factors affect 
charitable giving behavior. Experiment 1 demonstrated that a simple choice set enhancing 
perceived agency increased donations by increasing participation rates, but not the 
average donation amount. Experiment 2 used a text entry mechanism to demonstrate that 
a higher level of agency leads to even higher donations. Both experiments demonstrated 
that price incentives strongly affect the average donation amounts, and in some cases 
participation rates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The act of charitable giving challenges our understanding of human behavior. 
Donors seek to benefit others, but also respond to selfish incentives. Those who give to 
others do not maximize financial benefit to self, but do respond to financial incentives 
and other forms of personal benefit. Andreoni’s (1990) conception of charitable giving as 
impure altruism treats donors as quasi-consumers, who exhibit personal preferences in 
their giving decisions, just as consumers exhibit personal preferences in their purchasing 
behavior. How personal preferences govern the extent to which a person pursues 
altruistic desires is still a matter of considerable research.  Bekkers and Weipking (2011) 
identified eight mechanisms that drive giving decisions. Among those eight, donors 
consider the costs of giving, as well as psychological benefits and the alignment of 
values. We test the extent to which the psychological condition of agency and the 
economic condition of price relate to personal preferences for benefiting others. We ask 
how these two factors affect giving behavior while employed simultaneously. 
Giving money to others is considered to be a prosocial behavior, defined as a 
deed intended to benefit the welfare of others (Frey & Meier, 2004). Consistent with 
warm glow theory, prosocial action occurs for different reasons, including both altruistic 
motives and selfishness (e.g. Batson, 1994; Oliner, 2002; Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio, & 
Piliavin, 1995; Van de Vliert, Huang, & Levine, 2004). That is, individuals behave in a 
prosocial manner because it serves their own needs, and hence, prosocial behavior should 
be more prevalent in individualistic cultures. Using the World Values Survey, Welzel 
(2010) found that individualism and self-expression are in fact associated with altruism. 
Kemmelmeier, Jambor, and Letner (2006) found individualism in the US to be positively 
related to charitable giving and volunteering, and that both were more likely to occur in 
more individualist states. There are many economic and non-economic aspects of 
charitable giving that may be tested in experimental settings (c.f. Zarghamee et al., 2017). 
Our article explores two ways in which enhancing personal benefit to donors increases 
donative behavior. We alter the levels of agency and the prices of giving in “real charity” 
online experiments (see Eckel, Herberich & Meer, 2014) to investigate the relationships 
that these conditions have with giving outcomes. Agency and price effects on giving have 
been tested separately in controlled laboratory settings (c.f. Andreoni & Miller, 2002; 
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Berman & Small, 2012; Eckel & Grossman, 2003; Eckel, Herberich & Meer, 2014; 
Goswami & Urminski, 2016; Harbaugh, Mayr & Burghart, 2007), as well as in natural 
field experiments (see Eckel & Grossman, 2008; Karlan & List, 2007; Kessler, Milkman, 
& Zhang, 2017; Meer, 2014), and have been shown to increase donations in fundraising 
appeals. Our study pairs the two factors of agency and price into one study and asks how 
these mechanisms affect charitable giving behavior and how they interact with each 
other. The findings from our study help to develop theory for how agency and price relate 
to altruism, and inform researchers and practitioners on how they may be used to 
maximize prosocial, donative behavior.  
 
AGENCY IN PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR  
The concept of agency, or autonomy, is a psychological element of prosocial 
behavior related to individualism and is known to enhance the performance of the 
benefactor. Human agency is the capacity for people to decide between options. 
Weinstein and Ryan (2010) used self-determination theory to explain that those who 
perceive higher levels of agency, or autonomy, while performing prosocial activities 
experience higher well-being outcomes, and their efforts result in better outcomes for the 
recipients. They measured this effect among volunteers, with findings consistent with the 
theory. Other field experiments have investigated agency in a charitable giving context. 
Eckel, Herberich and Meer (2014) tested agency by giving annual donors to a large 
public university more options to direct the donation within the university. This 
manipulation led to an increase average donation amounts, but not an increase in the 
probability of donating, results that our findings will contradict.  Kessler, Milkman and 
Zhang (2017) similarly tested agency among donors to a prestigious university through 
simple modifications to the mail response cards, allowing the donors more perceived 
agency. They found that increased agency led to significant increases in donations among 
the “rich and powerful”, indicating that agency effects may be moderated by personal 
attributes or circumstances. Our study will use similar treatments by giving donors more 
control over their donation, increasing their perception of agency, while modifying 
various price conditions. 
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 Several studies have used laboratory settings to test agency and charitable giving. 
Harbaugh, Mayr, and Burghart (2007) tested the responses of individuals to different 
agency conditions (voluntarily donating to charity, or being taxed) with varying donation 
amounts, by tracking neural activity using fMRI scanning technology. They found that 
both the voluntary nature of a monetary transfer and the amount of a transfer affected the 
participants’ satisfaction with their decisions.  Berman and Small (2012) used 
experiments to test the hedonic effects of donating money with greater and lesser 
perceived agency, to see if people got more pleasure from giving when they got to choose 
or not. One of Berman and Small’s experiments used the online platform of Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), as a way to study charitable giving. We also used MTurk as 
our method for recruiting participants in the study.  In the Berman and Small (2010) 
experiment, participants were assigned UNICEF as their charitable recipient. Our design 
will allow participants more options for charities, as a way to augment the perception of 
agency. We anticipated that augmenting donor agency will increase overall donor 
behavior. 
 
THE PRICE OF GIVING 
In many countries, charitable donations are deductible from taxable income. This 
deductibility effectively reduces the “price” of making a donation. The price of giving 
can be defined as 𝑝 = 𝑑(1 − 𝑟), where 𝑝 is the price of giving, 𝑑 is the donation amount, 
and r is the tax rate. For example, if a person in a 20% tax bracket makes a $1,000 
donation to a nonprofit, the donation only costs the donor $800, because he or she 
foregoes $200 in taxes – the amount he or she would have paid on the $1,000 of income 
that was given to charity. So the price of giving $1 to charity, with a 20% tax rate, is 
$0.80. Basic economic theory predicts that as the price of giving decreases the amount of 
giving will increase, and a body of literature on the price of giving provides empirical 
support for this phenomenon (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011).  Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter 
(2002) modeled how changes in tax policies affect long-term giving behaviors, and found 
that removing tax incentives from those in a 30% tax bracket could reduce individual 
giving by 25 to 36 percent. Others have analyzed longitudinal, national charitable giving 
data and found varying price effects (Brooks, 2007; Peloz & Steel, 2005; Tiehen, 2001). 
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It is important to note that tax implications only affect those who itemize deductions on 
their tax returns, a small percentage of the population, but a large percentage (60%) of 
total donations (Deb, Wilhelm, Rooney, & Brown, 2003).  
Andreoni and Miller (2002) defined a basic utility model for giving as: 𝑈* =𝑢* 𝜋*, 𝜋. , where the utility for one’s self 𝑈* is determined by how an individual 
allocates an endowment between the payout to self 𝜋* and the payout to the other 𝜋.. 
After gathering evidence for how price affects giving, through a series of dictator game 
experiments, Andreoni and Miller encouraged future research to test variations of price 
with systematic changes in other giving conditions. They labeled other test conditions in 
their model as 𝛾 and wrote, “Future work will have to explore the more general 
assumptions that for a given γ the preferences U* = u* π*, π.; γ 	are well-behaved with 
respect to π*, π.  and that these preferences shift systematically as γ changes” (p. 738). 
For our study, we tested how giving preferences, depending on price, shift systematically 
at various levels of agency. In other words, we introduced agency as another giving 
condition, or 𝛾, and tested how agency modifies the price effects on the donor preference 
models.  
The price of giving has been operationalized in various ways through 
experiments. Eckel and Grossman (2003) used a laboratory setting to find that the 
mechanism for reducing the price of giving, either a rebate or a matching gift, makes a 
difference in how donors respond. They then replicated those findings in a natural field 
experiment with direct mail appeals (Eckel & Grossman, 2008). This suggests that the 
rebate from tax deductibility may not be the most effective public policy towards 
charitable giving.  Karlan and List (2007) also tested the price of giving using various 
matching gift programs in a large natural field experiment with direct mail appeals. They 
found that price effects through matching programs had limits, that a 1:1 match was just 
as effectual as higher matches (i.e. 2:1 or 3:1). Meer (2014) tested the price of giving, 
using an online giving platform, identifying various levels of administrative costs. We 
decided to use a rebate because we felt that it would be the most salient form of price 
manipulation for our participants, and the easiest to administer. 
Our paper develops the empirical evidence of price effects on individual giving 
behavior by combining elements of previous behavioral economics experiments and by 
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utilizing an increasingly popular online sampling technique. We use Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk as our online platform to collect our sample. This method is both quick 
and affordable compared to natural field experiments, and even running labs on campus. 
Thus it is ideal for initial, exploratory testing of theoretical assumptions. MTurk differs 
from Meer’s (2014) crowdfunding platform in that MTurk workers are not using the site 
specifically to make donations, and so our sample is not primed for making charitable 
contributions and more closely represents recipients of an uninvited online fundraising 
solicitation. Most significantly, compared to other experiments on the price of giving, we 
test the relationship of price and giving simultaneously with the variation of agency. 
Interaction of Agency and Price 
While it is not clear whether and how agency and price will interact, because these 
two variables have not previously been tested together, we make assumptions based on 
research of agency with other factors on giving. Kessler, Milkman, and Zhang (2017) found 
that the effect of agency with those deemed “rich” and “powerful” had significantly 
positive interaction with those particular variables. That is to say that, agency had a more 
pronounced effect on those who were categorized rich and powerful. While we do not 
collect wealth or title data on our sample, it is known that MTurk workers have lower 
average income than the general population (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). If 
agency enhances donation amounts among the wealthy, it may be that agency has a greater 
effect on those with lower price conditions. This rationale is based on the assumption that 
a lower price of giving effectively increases the “buying power” of a participant’s 
endowment in an experimental setting. 
MEASUREMENTS OF GIVING 
 Experiments on fundraising and charitable giving commonly employ three 
outcome variables designed to measure treatment effects on both the extensive and 
intensive margins of giving. These measures consist of the unconditional average 
donation, participation rate and conditional average donation (see Karlan and List, 2007). 
The unconditional average donation is the total amount of donations divided by the total 
number of those being solicited – in this study, all participants. The participation rate is 
the percentage of those solicited who make any donation, regardless of the amount. The 
conditional average donation is calculated as the mean donation among only those who 
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give. These measurements suggest that charitable giving behavior includes two basic 
decisions: whether or not to give, and how much to give. We seek to understand how 
agency and price affect both of these decision making processes.  
 
METHODS 
In order to test our assumptions about agency and price, two randomized 
controlled trials were conducted online. Each experiment recruited participants using 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). This method is widely used in marketing, 
psychology, and other fields, and it provides researchers with a platform to quickly and 
inexpensively test theoretical assumptions. Samples from MTurk are more representative 
of the larger society than groups of students on college campuses (Paolacci, Chandler & 
Ipeirotis, 2010). MTurk is affordable. It cost us less than $300 to collect a sample of 400 
participants. We paid each participant $0.50 to take a 2-minute survey (equivalent to a 
$15/hour payment). When we ran our experiments, we collected 400 responses for each 
experiment in less than an hour. Our experiments were conducted several weeks apart 
from each other, and collected samples from different M-Turk workers. We also 
restricted participation to U.S. based workers only, because the nonprofits we used are 
mostly located in the U.S. and would be more familiar to a U.S. sample. We did not 
choose other restrictions, because we wanted our findings to be more generalizable and 
useful in fundraising contexts in which large groups of people are being solicited.  
In the experiments, respondents were told that they had the chance to win a $10 
bonus. One participant in each experiment was awarded the bonus, but the participants 
were not aware of that probability, so they had no way to calculate the expected value of 
the bonus. We then asked each participant to consider a donation to a charitable 
organization, should they win the bonus. This strategy was used by Goswami and 
Urminsky (2016) to test other aspects of charitable giving. The potential bonus is similar 
to endowing a participant with a lottery ticket, which is known to maintain value for the 
participant (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). 
After being informed of the potential bonus, each participant was randomly 
assigned to one of eight different giving scenarios in which they could use the potential 
$10 bonus to donate to a charitable organization in $1 increments. The eight scenarios 
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came from a 2 x 4 design, in which there were two agency conditions and four prices of 
giving (see Appendix A). Participants only made one giving decision during the 
experiment, based on their particular scenario. Thus we compare giving choices across 
subjects, not within subjects, for varying price and agency conditions. We chose an 
across-subject design to eliminate effects of price referencing from other conditions. We 
also did not want to confound agency effects, by allowing participants to compare various 
agency treatments.  
Once the participants made a giving decision, they were asked a short series of 
questions consisting of manipulation checks and questions about potential covariates. 
After the surveys were completed, one of the participants in each experiment was 
selected, using a random number generator and then picking that number respondent. The 
participant was transferred the bonus money through MTurk payment system. If there 
was a donation chosen by that participant, the donation was made online by the authors 
and the donation receipt was emailed to the MTurk participant to prove the fulfillment of 
the donation. 
Price Variations 
The experiments used the same price variations, across both the control and 
treatment groups. Participants were randomly assigned one of four prices of giving: $1, 
$0.80, $0.50, and $0.20. The four prices of giving were operationalized through an 
immediate rebate. For the $1 condition, there was no rebate, and participants were 
informed that every dollar they donated to the charity would be deducted from their 
potential bonus. For the $0.80 condition, participants were informed that for every dollar 
they donated out of the bonus, they would get $0.20 back—so the donation of $1 would 
only cost them $0.80. Likewise, the rebate for the $0.50 price condition was $0.50; and 
the rebate for the $0.20 price of giving was $0.80. Participants were presented a table that 
indicated all of the possible choices for giving and how much their potential bonus would 
be (see Appendix A). This table was the result of feedback from pilot groups. It 
minimized any calculation the participant had to do, and was designed to clarify the 
rebate mechanism.  
Manipulation check and covariates 
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Following the giving decision in each experiment, respondents were asked several 
questions as a manipulation check to see if the treatment altered the participant’s 
perceived agency in giving. The check consisted of three items that asked respondents to 
rate on a 5-point Likert scale how much they agreed with the statements (1= agree, 5 = 
disagree): 1. “I was able to choose where I would donate”; 2. “I was able to choose how 
much I would donate”; and 3. “I had complete control over my donation decision.” 
Regarding the second question, there should not have been a significant variation, as 
participants in both control and treatment groups were given the same price variations. 
This was included to detect response bias, if any.  
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk does not provide any demographic or other 
information on individual workers. This information has to collected via survey and adds 
to the expense of the survey. We surveyed each participant on three covariates known to 
correlate closely with giving behavior. We asked about charitable giving amounts to 
other nonprofits in the past 12 months, volunteer activity in the past 12 months, and 
religious attendance. Paolacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis (2010) noted that MTurk workers 
have a lower average income than the U.S. average. We did not ask about income 
because of space constraints, concerns about the integrity of response data, and because 
the other covariates are also known to be strong correlates with giving, when controlling 
for income variation. We then used the data on covariates to test the randomization 
process, to be sure that our findings are not confounded with random variation between 
groups on factors known to influence giving. We used t-tests between the agency 
treatment and control conditions and one-way ANOVAs to test differences between price 
variations. In Experiment 1, we found no statistically significant differences for any of 
our covariates between any of the cells. In Experiment 2, we found that the control group 
had significantly higher religious attendance than the treatment group, as will be 
discussed later. Because religious attendance is significantly different in this group, we 
will include religion as a covariate in the relevant analyses. We acknowledge that this 
difference suggests that we collected too few covariates, and that we are limited in our 
ability to test the randomization of our samples. 
 
THE EXPRIMENTS 
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Experiment 1 – Drop-down list 
For the first experiment, the control condition (no choice), participants were 
randomly assigned one of ten possible charities, taken from a list of the top ten charities 
in the United States for donations received (Forbes, 2016): United Way, Red Cross, 
Feeding America, Salvation Army, YMCA, St. Jude's Children's Research Hospital, Food 
for the Poor, Boys and Girls Club, Catholic Relief Services, Goodwill Industries.  These 
charities were selected because of their likeliness to be recognized, and to represent a 
variety of causes. The charities were pre-tested in a pilot survey, and due to feedback the 
Red Cross was added to the list and Task Force for Global Health was dropped. The 
control group had no ability to choose which charity they were assigned and they did not 
see the list of the other charities (See Appendix B). 
The agency treatment in the first experiment allowed participants to pick a charity 
from a list of ten charities, using a drop-down list (see Appendix C). The same list of ten 
charities was used as the list in the control condition. In the agency treatment, the 
participants could see the options and make their own decision from the choice set, which 
charity they would prefer to give to. This treatment is intended to increase the agency of 
donors in regards to where they direct a donation. The decision of where to give enhances 
with the mechanism of “aligning values” identified by Bekkers and Weipking (2011), and 
would theoretically increase their willingness to donate.   
Results 
We first tested both the control and treatment groups for any significant difference 
in donations between the choices of ten charities from the drop-down list, using a one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA). We found no significant variance in donation 
amounts within either the assigned charities in the control group: F (9,192) = 0.96, p = 
0.48, or the chosen charities in the treatment group: F (9,192) = 1.53, p = 0.14. We then 
tested responses to the manipulation checks to determine whether the treatment had any 
effect on the perceived agency of participants. On a 5 point Likert scale where 1 is 
“strongly disagree” and 5 is “strongly agree”, those with the drop-down list more strongly 
agreed that they had control over “where to donate”, (M = 4.45, SD = 1.01) than those 
who were assigned a charity (M = 2.07, SD = 1.63), t (403) = 17.66, p < .001 (see Table 
1).  The treatment group also had a small but significant increase in the perceived agency 
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of the broader “donation decision” with virtually no difference in the perceived agency 
for “how much to donate”, as would be expected (see Appendix D).  
We then investigate our primary research question: how do agency and price 
affect giving participation rates and average donation amounts? Table 1 presents the 
differences in means between our agency treatment and control groups. We find some 
initial evidence that augmented agency increased participation rates, but not necessarily 
donation amounts. When comparing the various price variations to the control condition 
of $1 price of giving using pairwise t-tests, we find strong evidence that lowering prices 
does increase giving amounts, but not necessarily participation rates (see Table 2). The 
only price for which participation rates significantly increase is in the most extreme, 
$0.20 price condition. 
Table 1. Experiment 1 participation rates and average donations by agency 
condition, with t-tests for differences in means between the agency treatment and 
control condition. 
Agency 
Condition: 
Perceived 
Agency 
(where to 
donate) 
Unconditional 
Average 
Donation 
Participation 
Rate 
Conditional 
Average Donation 
Control 
Condition (no 
choice) 
n=202  
2.07 
(1.63) 
$3.07 
(2.56) 
57.4% 
(.51) 
$5.34 
(3.28) 
Agency 
Treatment 
(drop-down 
list) 
n=203 
4.45 
(1.01) $3.78 
(3.27) 
69.5% 
(.50) 
$5.44 
(3.27) 
Difference: 2.38 *** $0.71 * 12.1% ** $0.10 (n/s) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. P-values from t-tests of differences in means 
indicated by: * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, *** for p<.001 
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Table 2. Experiment 1 participation rates and average donations by price 
variations, with pair-wise t-tests for differences in means between each variation 
and the $1 price of giving. 
 
Price of giving: 
Unconditional 
Average Donation 
Participation Rate Conditiona
l Average 
Donation 
1$ (control) 
n=102  
$2.17 
(2.53) 
58.8% 
(.49) 
$3.68 
(2.30) 
$0.80 
n=101 
$2.63 
(3.39) 
56.4% 
(.50) 
$4.67 
(3.29) 
Difference from control: $0.46 -02.4% $0.99 * 
$0.50 
n=103 
$3.40 
(3.75) 
63.1% 
(.54) 
$5.38 
(3.39) 
Difference from control: $1.23 ** 04.3% $1.70 *** 
$0.20 
n=99 
$5.56 
(4.09) 
75.8% 
(.43) 
$7.33 
(2.99) 
Difference from control: $3.39 *** 16.9% ** $3.65 *** 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. P-values from t-tests of differences in means 
indicated by: * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, *** for p<.001 
 We further tested our main effects as well as an interaction between agency and 
price using regression analyses. Table 3 presents the results from the regression models 
for each giving outcome - unconditional giving, participation, and conditional giving. For 
the regressions of unconditional and conditional donations, we used OLS regression, and 
for the models on participation we used logistic regressions reporting odds ratios. We 
used our treatment and our price variable as dependent variables in the first model for 
each outcome, and then we add an interaction term to test for the interaction between 
price and agency. From Table 3, we interpret that providing participants a drop-down list 
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increases the odds of participation by 69.3%, which results in a $0.69 increase in 
donation per participant, but does not significantly increase the average donation amount 
amount those who donate. Decreasing the price, however, does significantly increase 
average donations and the participation, which increases the unconditional donation 
amounts. We did not find a significant interaction effect between agency and price in any 
of the models for the various giving outcomes. However, it could be that our sample size 
is not large enough to detect this interaction. 
 
Table	3.	Regressions	of	Giving	Outcomes,	Testing	Interaction	of	Agency	Treatment	
and	Price	
		
Unconditional	
Donations	
(Including	$0)	
Participation	
	
Conditional	
Donations	(Excluding	
$0)	
		 b/se	 b/se	
odds	
ratio	/se	
odds	
ratio	/se	 b/se	 b/se	
Treatment		 0.685*	 -0.072	 1.693*	 1.221	 0.04	 -0.552	
(drop-down	
List)	 (-0.347)	 (-0.849)	 (0.356)	 (0.613)	 (-0.381)	 (-0.948)	
Price	
1.085**
*	 0.627	 1.285**	 1.052	 1.184***	 0.839	
(high	to	low)	 (-0.156)	 (-0.494)	 (0.122)	 (0.310)	 (-0.167)	 (-0.533)	
Treatment	x	Price	 0.304	 	 1.146	 	 0.227	
	  (-0.311)	 	 (0.219)	 	 (-0.334)	
Constant	 0.379	 0.76	 0.729	 0.851	 2.294***	 2.597***	
	 (-0.457)	 (-0.602)	 (0.198)	 (0.296)	 (-0.514)	 (-0.68)	
Observations	 405	 405	 405	 405	 257	 257	
R-squared	 0.12	 0.12	 	  0.17	 0.17	
Adjusted	R-
squared	 0.11	 0.11	 		 		 0.16	 0.16	
Note:	OLS	regressions	used	for	donation	amounts,	and	logistic	regression	used	for	
participation;	standard	errors	in	parentheses.	The	price	variable	is	ordered	from	high	
to	low.	
*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	 	    
 
 In Experiment 1, we begin to find some evidence that agency effects participation, 
but not the conditional giving amount. In other words, those who were given more 
agency were more likely to make some form of donation, but they did not make higher 
donations than the control donors. A lower price of giving does lead to higher giving 
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amounts among those who give, but from Table 2 we see that only the lowest price of 
giving induces a significantly higher percentage of participants to make some form of 
donation. These initial findings contradict those of Eckel, Herberich and Meer’s (2014), 
who found that giving people more choice in directing a donation did not lead to 
increased likelihood of participation, but did lead to larger donations. In order to further 
investigate these relationships, we test another treatment intended to evoke an even 
greater sense of agency. Our initial evidence suggests there is no interaction between 
agency and price but is not conclusive. 
 
Experiment 2 – Text entry box 
 In the second experiment, the control condition was the same as Experiment 1. 
The control participants had no choice of what charity to give to, but they were randomly 
assigned a charity from the same list of ten used in the previous experiment. 
Agency treatment: Text entry box 
The agency treatment in this experiment allowed participants to write in their own 
charity. They were given a text entry box, in which they could type the name of any 
charity they like. This treatment was designed to augment the ability of the donors to 
choose “where” they give, a manipulation meant to allow greater alignment of values, 
which would be expected to result in higher donations. To reinforce their choice of 
charity, once they typed the name of their charity into the text entry box and clicked the 
button to move to the next screen, the name of their charity appeared in the following 
question, that asked how much they would be willing to give to that charity (see 
Appendix E). 
Results 
Experiment 2 yielded even stronger results in the manipulation check, with the 
difference in the perceived agency for where to donate even more pronounced. Those 
with a text entry box agreed more strongly that they had control over where to donate, on 
a 5 point Likert scale where 1 is “strongly disagree” and 5 is “strongly agree”, (M = 4.70, 
SD = .86) compared with the control group (M = 1.86, SD = 1.43), t (405) = 24.28, p < 
.001 (see Table 4). As before, the difference in means for the second item of the 
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manipulation check, the perceived control over donation amount, was small and not 
statistically significant.  
From Experiment 2, we report similar findings as those from the Experiment 1. 
Table 4 presents the results series of t-tests comparing our agency treatment to the control 
condition Those with the agency treatment, using a text entry box to write in the name of 
a charity, gave significantly higher unconditional average donations (M = $5.45, SD = 
3.88) than those in the control condition (M = $3.97, SD = 3.92), a difference in means of 
$1.48, t (406) = 3.84, p = .0001 (see Table 4). This agency treatment, allowing people to 
write in their own charity, had an overall effect size of Cohen’s d = 0.38. When we look 
at the components of this effect, by analyzing the participation rates and conditional 
average donations, we found that an increase in agency led to higher participation rates, 
but not to significantly higher donation amounts among those who gave. Again, agency 
led more people to give, but not to give more.  
Table 4. Experiment 2 Giving Outcomes by Agency Condition 
Agency 
Condition: 
Perceived 
Agency 
(where to 
donate) 
Unconditional 
Average 
Donation 
Participation 
Rate 
Conditional 
Average 
Donation 
Control 
Condition (no 
choice) 
n=202  
1.86 
(1.43) 
$3.97 
(3.92) 
67.6% 
(.47) 
$5.88 
(3.28) 
Agency 
Treatment (open 
text box) 
n=205 
4.70 
(0.86) 
$5.45 
(3.89) 
84.4% 
(.36) 
$6.45 
(3.34) 
Difference: 2.84 *** $1.48 *** 16.7% *** $0.58 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 As mentioned earlier, we detected significantly higher rates of religious 
attendance in the control group, while testing the randomization process with covariates. 
This discrepancy only strengthens our finding an increase in participation among the 
agency treatment group, as the higher religious attendance would indicate a greater 
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willingness to donate among the control group. We will discuss this further in the next 
section that compares both experiments.  
 Looking at the price effects in Experiment 2, we again found that decreases in the 
price of giving yielded higher donation amounts (see Table 5). This time, however, the 
price reductions also correlated with significant increases in participation at both the 
$0.50 and $0.20 prices of giving. This is a more pronounced effect on participation than 
that of Experiment 1, where we found increased participation only in the $0.20 price 
group. This suggests that with a higher level of agency, price may also induce higher 
participation. We again tested an interaction term using logistic and linear regressions, 
but found no evidence of a significant interaction between agency and price (see Table 
6). Agency and price both affect charitable giving in different ways, and don’t seem to 
interact with each other. 
Table 5. Experiment 2 Giving Outcomes by Price Variations 
Price of giving: 
Unconditional 
Average 
Donation 
Participation 
Rate 
Conditional 
Average Donation 
1$ (control) 
n=102  
$2.66 
(3.06) 
61.8% 
(.49) 
$4.30 
(2.83) 
$0.80 
n=102 
$4.05 
(3.77) 
71.6% 
(.45) 
$5.66 
(3.28) 
Difference from 
control: $1.39 ** 9.8% $1.36 ** 
$0.50 
n=103 
$5.05 
(3.80) 
83.3% 
(.37) 
$6.06 
(3.33) 
Difference from 
control: $2.39 *** 21.6% *** $1.76 *** 
$0.20 
n=99 
$7.09 
(3.87) 
87.3% 
(.34) 
$8.12 
(2.95) 
Difference from 
control: $4.43 *** 25.5% *** $3.82 *** 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table	6.	Regressions	of	Giving	Outcomes,	Testing	Interaction	of	Price	and	Agency	
		
Unconditional	
Donations	(Including	
$0)	
Participation	
	
Conditional	
Donations	
(Excluding	$0)	
		 b/se	 b/se	
odds	
ratio	/se	
odds	
ratio	/se	 b/se	 b/se	
Treatment	 1.549***	 1.281	 2.884***	 1.795	 0.69	 1.205	
(open	text	
Box)	 (-0.353)	 (-0.863)	 (0.732)	 (1.018)	 -0.359	 -0.939	
Price	 1.437***	 1.275*	 1.692***	 1.248	 1.220***	 1.528**	
(high	to	low)	 (-0.158)	 (-0.5)	 (0.194)	 (0.432)	 (-0.161)	 (-0.542)	
Religious	
attendance	 0.062	 0.064	 1.150	 1.153	 -0.06	 -0.061	
	 (-0.15)	 (-0.15)	 (0.126)	 (0.127)	 (-0.149)	 (-0.149)	
Treatment	x	
Price	 	 0.107	 	 1.252	 	 -0.194	
	  (-0.315)	 	 (0.305)	 	 (-0.326)	
Constant	 0.209	 0.342	 0.449	 0.536	 2.683***	 2.379**	
	 (-0.539)	 (-0.666)	 (0.161)	 (0.218)	 (-0.588)	 (-0.78)	
Observations	 407	 407	 407	 407	 309	 309	
R-squared	 0.2	 0.2	 	  0.17	 0.17	
Adjusted	R-
squared	 0.2	 0.19	 		 		 0.16	 0.16	
Note:	OLS	regressions	used	for	unconditional	and	conditional	donations	and	logistic	
regression	used	for	participation.	Religious	attendance	entered	as	a	control	variable.	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	The	price	variable	is	ordered	from	high	to	low.	
*	p<0.05,	**	p<0.01,	***	p<0.001	 	    
 
Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2 
 A comparison of the two experiments strengthens the evidence for more agency 
increasing donative behavior. Figure 1 presents a bar chart with the levels of perceived 
agency and the unconditional average donations, between the treatment and control 
groups in both experiments. Comparing the treatment groups from both experiments, we 
found that the open text box resulted in significantly higher perceived agency than the 
drop-down list (Mtext box = 4.70, SD = 0.86 vs. Mdrop-down = 4.45, SD = 1.01), t (408) = -
2.68, p < .01). These changes in agency resulted in higher participation rates in both 
experiments, but not in average donation amounts among those who did give. This rise in 
the number of participants willing to donate something led to significantly higher giving 
overall. The unconditional average donation in Experiment 2 among the treatment group 
(M = $5.45, SD = 3.88) was significantly higher than the unconditional average donations 
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of the treatment group in Experiment 1 (M = $3.78, SD = 3.70), t (408) = -4.46, p < .001. 
This supports the notion that an increase in the agency of donors leads to higher 
donations overall.  
Figure 1. Perceived Agency and Average Donations in Agency Treatment and 
Control Groups in both Experiments. 
 
Note: The control group in Experiment 2 had significantly higher rates of religious 
attendance, which helps to explain the higher average donation than the control 
group in Experiment 1. 
Other factors may account for the differences in donations between the two 
experiments. In Figure 1, we see that the control group in Experiment 2 has higher 
donations than the treatment group in Experiment 1. This is the group that had the 
significantly higher rates of religious attendance, which may explain some of the 
difference. There may be other covariates that account for the difference that we did not 
capture. Moreover, the experiments were conducted several weeks apart, and at different 
times of the day, which may account for undetected fixed effects. Comparing the two 
experiments provides initial evidence that increasing perceived agency among potential 
0
2
4
6
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Control Drop-down List Control Open Text Box
Perceived Agency Average Donation
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donors leads to higher participation, and thus higher total donations. The comparison also 
suggests that certain mechanisms are more effective in increasing perceived agency. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Much has been written on the price of giving. Testing the price of giving has been 
conducted in laboratory experiments, but only a few have used giving to actual charitable 
organizations (c.f. Berman and Small, 2012; Eckel & Grossman, 2003). Our study uses 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to test charitable giving scenarios to actual charitable 
organizations, in a controlled experiment. Although much has been written about MTurk 
workers and the types of sample populations one can get by using MTurk (Paolacci, 
Chandler and Ipeirotis, 2010), little is known about their donative behavior. We know 
that MTurk participants are motivated by making money (Sheehan and Pittman, 2016), 
but it is unclear how strong the profit motive is, and if it would override any charitable 
inclinations. Our experiments show that U.S.-based MTurk participants are willing to 
donate to charity at the sacrifice of their own bonus money. This study opens the doors 
for further research on charitable giving using MTurk as a platform. 
 The importance of agency in charitable giving is not well understood. The agency 
treatment used in the experiments were very simple mechanisms used to test the theory 
that increase agency leads to increased donations. We found significant increases in 
participation rates and overall donations, although not the average gift amounts. This 
could have immediate implications for professional fundraisers. Finding ways to increase 
the agency of donors, such as allowing donors more say in where a donation is directed 
could lead to significantly higher contributions to nonprofits. For example, United Way 
gave donors more choice of where to direct their donation to increase their participation 
in corporate campaigns. The open text box mechanism is easily employed in online 
settings, and could be used in a variety of ways to increase perceived agency. More 
research translating experimental findings to application in the field is needed. Agency is 
a complex psychological construct. Some aspects of agency, such as freedom to pick 
one’s recipient, yielded higher donations than other forms, such as picking from a list.  
Agency also has its limits, where too many choices can lead to diminished consumer 
responses (Simonson & Tversky, 1992). More research on the types and bounds of 
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agency involved in charitable giving will help identify the most effective types of agency 
mechanisms. 
Kessler, Milkman, and Zhang (2017) found that a greater sense of agency had a 
more significant effect on the the wealthy and powerful, than on other donors. The use of 
MTurk limited our sample to participants with relatively lower income. Agency may 
have varying effects across other dimensions of social and economic demographics. We 
did not find a significant interaction between agency and price. However, our samples 
may have been too small to detect a true interaction. Our findings also contradicted in 
some ways the findings of Eckel, Herberich and Meer (2014). We found that agency 
increased participation but not giving amounts, while they found the inverse relationship. 
More research will have to be done to better understand the contexts in which agency 
effects the various aspects of the donation decision making process. 
Our findings on price effects are not surprising, but our study makes two 
significant contributions to the literature. First, we found that price primarily affected the 
conditional donation amounts, but only the lowest prices affected the participations rates. 
This distinction may have implications in research designed to estimate tax effects on 
charitable giving. Furthermore, such price effects will have to be tested with other 
mechanisms for manipulating price, such as matching gift programs. Second, price did 
not interact with agency. While this may easily be overlooked as a failure to reject the 
null hypothesis, there are some potential theoretical implications. Is it possible that donor 
process varying motivations separately and distinctly from each other. The M-Turk 
donors in this study seemed to process the price variations completely separately from the 
agency treatments. Fundraising appeals often combine a variety of elements designed to 
attract donors, with little consideration to how the relate or don’t relate to each other. 
Suppose that an agency treatment were employed first to increase participation, and then 
a price variation were employed to increase average donation amounts. Then these two 
separate mechanisms may be used more effectively. Knowing the distinct effects of 
various factors in giving is important to future research in charitable giving.  Being able 
to segment out the psychological processes of charitable giving will allow researchers to 
more carefully study this challenging human behavior.  
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APPENDIX A. CHOICE SETS IN THE VARIOUS PRICE OF GIVING 
CONDITIONS 
Choice set for $1 price of giving 
Your donation 
to [Charity]: 
$0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10 
Your potential 
bonus: 
$10 $9 $8 $7 $6 $5 $4 $3 $2 $1 $0 
 
Choice set for $0.80 price of giving 
Your 
donation 
to 
[Charity]: 
$0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10 
Your 
potential 
bonus: 
$10 $9.20 $8.40 $7.60 $6.80 $6 $5.20 $4.40 $3.60 $2.80 $2 
 
Choice set for $0.50 price of giving 
Your 
donation to 
[Charity]: 
$0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10 
Your 
potential 
bonus: 
$10 $9.50 $9 $8.50 $8 $7.50 $7 $6.50 $6 $5.50 $5 
 
Choice set for $0.20 price of giving 
Your 
donation to 
[Charity]: 
$0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10 
Your 
potential 
bonus: 
$10 $9.80 $9.60 $9.40 $9.20 $9 $8.80 $8.60 $8.40 $8.20 $8 
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APPENDIX B. CONTROL CONDITION IN AGENCY AND PRICE 
EXPERIMENTS. 
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APPENDIX C. AGENCY TREATMENT IN EXPERIMENT 1 – DROP-DOWN 
LIST 
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APPENDIX D. EXPERIMENT 1: PARTICIPATION RATES AND MEAN 
DONATIONS BY PRICE AND AGENCY 
 Participation rate 
(s.d), n 
Average donation amount ($ 
US) 
(s.d.), n 
Agency /  
Price of Giving 
Control 
Group 
Agency 
Treatment 
Diff.: Control 
Group 
Agency 
Treatment 
Diff.: 
$1.00  .59 
(.50), 
n=51 
.59 
(.50), 
n=51 
0 
3.60 
(2.58), 
n=30 
3.77 
(2.01), 
n=30 
0.16 
$0.80  .49 
(.50), 
n=51 
.64 
(.48), 
n=50 
.15  
5.08 
(3.35), 
n=25 
4.34 
(3.26), 
n=32 
-0.74 
Difference: -.10 .05   1.48 * 0.57  
$0.50  .48 
(.50), 
n=52 
.78 
(.42), 
n=52 
.30 
***  
5.32 
(3.42), 
n=25 
5.43 
(3.42), 
n=40 
0.11 
Difference 
(from $1): -.11 .20 *  1.72 * 1.66 *  
$0.20  .75 
(.43), 
n=48 
.76 
(.43), 
n=51 
.01 
7.00 
(3.28), 
n=36 
7.64 
(2.71), 
n=39 
0.64 
Difference 
(from $1): 
.16 * .18 *  3.40 *** 3.87 ***  
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. P-values from t-tests of differences in means 
are as follows: * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, *** for p<.001 
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APPENDIX E. AGENCY TREATMENT IN EXPERIMENT 2 – TEXT ENTRY BOX 
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APPENDIX F. MEAN SCORES ON MANIPULATION CHECK ITEMS:  
 
 Experiment 1 
Likert scale responses: (1= Strongly 
Agree, 5 = Strongly disagree) 
Control  Treatment Difference 
“I was able to choose where I would 
donate”  
2.07 
(1.63) 
4.45 
(1.01) 
2.38*** 
“I was able to choose how much I would 
donate” 
1.41 
(1.00) 
1.39 
(0.93) 
0.02 
“I had complete control over my donation 
decision.” 
4.10 
(1.12) 
4.59 
(0.95) 
0.49*** 
 Experiment 2 
 Control  Treatment Difference 
“I was able to choose where I would 
donate”  
1.86 
(1.43) 
4.70 
(0.86) 
2.84*** 
“I was able to choose how much I would 
donate” 
1.34 
(0.82) 
1.32 
(0.85) 
0.02 
“I had complete control over my donation 
decision.” 
3.92 
(1.26) 
4.61 
(0.91) 
0.69*** 
P-values from t-tests of differences in means are as follows: * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, 
*** for p<.001 
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Abstract 
 
 Donor-advised funds (DAFs) are becoming increasingly popular. DAFs receive a 
growing share of all charitable donations and control a sizable proportion of grants made 
to other nonprofits. The growth of DAFs has generated controversy over their function as 
intermediary philanthropic vehicles. Using a panel data set of 996 DAF organizations 
from 2007 to 2016, this article provides an empirical analysis of DAF activity. We 
conduct longitudinal analyses of key DAF metrics, such as grants and payout rates. We 
find that a few large organizations heavily skew the aggregated data for a rather 
heterogeneous group of nonprofits. These panel data are then analyzed with 
macroeconomic indicators to analyze changes in DAF metrics during economic 
recessions. We find that, in general, DAF grantmaking is relatively resilient to recessions. 
We also find payout rates increased during times of recession, as did a new variable we 
call the flow rate.  
	 37	
Introduction 
The growth of donor-advised funds (DAFs) demands more attention from 
researchers. With tens of thousands of new donor-advised fund accounts established 
every year, they have been called “the fastest-growing vehicle in philanthropy” (National 
Philanthropic Trust, 2017). In 2016, DAFs accounted for 10% of charitable donations by 
individuals (Andreoni, 2017). That same year, Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund, a donor-
advised fund sponsor, surpassed the United Way as the top nonprofit in donations 
received (Lindsay, Olson-Phillips, & Stiffman, 2016; National Philanthropic Trust, 
2017). Every year, donor-advised funds facilitate hundreds of thousands of people 
making billions of dollars of transfers to the nonprofit sector. This article analyzes a 
comprehensive data set to better understand the flow of money through donor-advised 
funds as intermediary philanthropic organizations.  
We begin by overviewing the fundamental DAF activities and the different 
types of sponsor organizations. We briefly review issues regarding donor-advised 
funds that are salient to public policy debate. We then present our data and our 
analyses with two specific aims: 1. Analyze how donor-advised fund grantmaking 
relates to other metrics; and 2. Explain how DAF activities relate to economic 
conditions. Using a panel data set of nearly one thousand donor-advised fund 
organizations from 2007-2016, we offer empirical analyses of grants, payout rates, 
and a new metric called flow rate. Merging this panel data with macroeconomic 
indicators, we then explore how DAF activity changes during recession conditions. 
We discover important correlations between DAF activity and economic conditions 
that will be useful for policy considerations. While other forms of charitable giving 
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generally drop during economic downturns, we find that grants from DAFs remain 
relatively stable in recession conditions, despite reduction in contributions and 
decline in assets. This contributes to an increase in payout rates and flow rates during 
recessions. Given these findings, donor-advised funds may be an important resource 
to the nonprofit economy in future recessions. 	
Overview 
Donor-advised funds are intermediary philanthropic vehicles. They function as 
personal giving accounts, like checking or savings accounts that are designated 
irrevocably for charitable giving. There are three basic activities that occur in the use of 
donor-advised funds (see Figure 1). First, a person contributes money, or other assets, 
into a donor-advised fund account. The account is held by a 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
organization, known as a donor-advised fund sponsor, so the contribution into the 
account is considered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to be a tax-deductible 
donation. Second, the nonprofit organization manages the assets in the account for a fee. 
Third, the donor advises the sponsor to make grants out of the donor-advised fund 
account to recipient public charities. 
[Figure 1. here] 
 Donor-advised fund sponsors can be grouped into three categories: community 
foundations, single-issue charities, and national sponsor organizations (National 
Philanthropic Trust, 2017). Community foundations were the original sponsors of donor-
advised funds. They are the most common type (60% of all DAF sponsors) and usually 
attract donors within a specific geographic region. Single-issue charities host donor-
advised funds as a way to attract and retain donors for a certain cause, such as religion or 
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education. National sponsor organizations (NSOs) are typically subsidiary nonprofits to 
financial services providers such as Fidelity, Vanguard, or Schwab. There were only 46 
NSO entities that reported to the IRS in 2015 (5% of all DAF sponsors), but these 
relatively few organizations controlled about half (49%) of all assets under management 
in donor-advised funds.  
 
Donor-advised Fund Issues  
There are many reasons why people use donor-advised funds. They offer low 
cost, easy-to-use solutions for conducting charitable giving. However, the proliferation of 
donor-advised funds has sparked public policy debates around several issues (Daniels, 
2015). This section explains some of the main issues that donor-advised fund reform 
advocates raise. This review gives context to our analyses on grantmaking and DAF 
activity. However, the purpose of our analyses is not to respond to the debates, but rather 
to provide insightful empirical evidence to inform policy discussions. 
Donor-Advised Fund Growth 
What makes donor-advised funds an important topic to study is the sheer scope of 
their growth in recent years (Dagher, 2017). Daniels and Lindsay (2017) have aptly 
described the expansion of donor-advised fund usage as “reshaping the philanthropy 
landscape” (p. 26). In their annual report on donor-advised funds, National Philanthropic 
Trust (2018) reported that in the fiscal year 2017, the total assets under management by 
donor-advised funds reached over $110 B (an increase of 27.3% over the previous year), 
and a total of 463,622 individual accounts (an increase of 60.2%). In comparison to the 
82,516 private foundations that control about $856 B in assets, donor-advised funds 
represent a significant market share of nonprofit assets. In the same year, DAFs granted 
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$19.08 B, roughly 40% of the $49.5 B granted by private foundations (National 
Philanthropic Trust, 2018). One caveat to this statistic is that DAFs are able to make 
grants to other DAFs. In a special report on donor-advised funds, Giving USA (2018) 
reported: “From 2012 to 2015, DAF-to-DAF granting accounted for 4.4 percent of all 
dollars from donor-advised fund grants” (p. 29). On all measures, assets, number of users, 
grants distributed, and contributions received, donor-advised funds have experienced 
prolific growth, which raises the importance of understanding them more fully. 
Timing of the Tax Deduction 
Perhaps the most attractive feature of donor-advised funds is also the most 
controversial. Donors claim a tax deduction in the year that they contribute to the DAF, 
without needing to decide where the money will be distributed. Rooney (2017) notes that 
this separation in timing makes it easier for donors to make major giving decisions and 
allows donors to maximize tax benefits during periods of income fluctuation. There is no 
legal requirement for money placed in a donor-advised fund to be used within a certain 
timeframe; it is possible that the money could sit in the account indefinitely. Madoff 
(2016a) questioned the current legal treatment of donor-advised funds, and argued that 
donors should not get a publicly subsidized tax-deduction until their donation is in the 
hands of an organization that will use it to create public goods.  
Tax Advantages 
The immediate deduction and other tax treatments of donor-advised funds allow 
their users several tax advantages. Contributions of appreciated assets into donor-advised 
funds avoid capital gains taxes and receive a deduction for the fair market value of the 
asset (such donations to private foundations do not receive a deduction for the full fair-
	 41	
market value). Moreover, donor-advised funds can be used to bunch charitable donations 
that normally would be made over a period of years. Andreoni (2017) explained how 
using a donor-advised fund to front-load charitable giving into a single year maximizes 
tax advantages. There is some evidence that the recent increase in the standard deduction 
prompted a spike in contributions to donor-advised funds at the end of 2017 (Rubin, 
2018). These tax advantages are a driving motivation for the use of DAFs, but also cost 
the federal government through the loss of tax revenue, and some suggest that such tax 
advantages benefit primarily the wealthy (The Economist, 2018). Andreoni (2017) 
explained that from a public policy standpoint, net societal benefit of DAFs would only 
be worth the cost if they generated more charitable giving to compensate for losses in tax 
revenue. Many argue that such tax advantages should not be offered without a guarantee 
for when and how the money will be used for charitable purposes (Gelles, 2018; Hussey, 
2010; Madoff, 2016b).  
Regulation 
The timing of the tax deduction has led to policy suggestions around payout rates 
and time limits on donor-advised funds. Madoff (2016a) suggested requiring DAF 
accounts to meet a minimum payout rate, like private foundations. Generally, the 
organization-level payout rates of DAF sponsors well exceed the 5% minimum imposed 
on private foundations, as will be shown later in this paper. However, payout rates of 
individual accounts within a DAF sponsor may range widely. In 2014, David Camp of 
the House Ways and Committee, proposed to tax individual donor-advised fund accounts 
if the money had not been allocated within five years (Colinvaux, 2017; Daniels, 2015). 
At the organization-level, Andreoni (2017) found that the “shelf-life” of money is 
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between 3 to 4 years. Both the minimum payout rate and time limit for DAF accounts are 
attempts to bring more assurance that money going into donor-advised funds will be used 
in a timely manner for public purposes. Other possible regulations involve more 
accountability, regulation of grants, or different tax treatments for contributions into 
DAFs (Colinvaux, 2017).  
Available Data 
The biggest limitation to the study of donor-advised funds is the availability of 
data. Brostek’s (2006) Government Accountability Office report offered summary 
statistics and requested that more data be collected on DAFs by the IRS. The Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 began to require DAF sponsors to report specific information on 
their annual Form 990. Since then, the Treasury Department (McMahon, 2011), 
Congressional Research Services (Sherlock & Gravelle, 2012) and the IRS (Arnsberger, 
2012, 2016) have produced reports that used this 990 data to analyze DAF trends over 
time. These reports provide summary statistics on aggregated IRS data, and some 
bivariate analysis with little or no inferential statistics. In 2016, the IRS was mandated to 
release machine-readable data from electronic filings of 990s (Orsen-Phillips, 2016; 
Perry, 2015), however not all DAF sponsors file electronically and the data format still 
requires extensive manual work. 
Starting in 2006, National Philanthropic Trust (NPT), which is itself a DAF 
sponsor, began compiling 990 data made publicly available by the IRS. NPT has used 
this compiled dataset to produce an annual report on donor-advised funds (National 
Philanthropic Trust, 2017). The NPT report is often cited by other articles as a primary 
source of donor-advised fund statistics (c.f. Andreoni, 2017; Colinvaux, 2017; Madoff, 
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2014; Rooney, 2017). The Chronicle of Philanthropy, has collected its own primary data 
by conducting annual surveys of 105 of the largest donor-advised fund sponsors since 
1999. This data is useful because it has information not collected by the Form 990, such 
as administrative fees, and because it predates 2006, when all DAF sponsors began 
reporting to the IRS. Giving USA (2018) produced a special report on donor-advised 
funds, using IRS Statistics of Income microdata. Other primary data come from annual 
reports produced by DAF sponsors themselves, such as Fidelity Charitable (2017) and 
National Christian Foundation (2017). What is needed is a deeper analysis of donor-
advised fund activity, to better understand trends and behaviors within this subset of 
nonprofits.	
	
Data for this Study 
 The data we use allow us to investigate DAFs with more granular analyses than 
previous empirical work. They have been collected on discrete DAF sponsor 
organizations and, therefore, can better reveal some of the complexities of donor-advised 
funds. Beginning in 2006, all donor-advised fund sponsors report four relevant pieces of 
data: 1) the total number of accounts managed by the DAF sponsor, 2) the total value of 
contributions collected, 3) the total year-end value of assets, and 4) the total value of 
grants made. These variables are reported by each sponsor organization as aggregated 
totals; they are not individual, account-level data. The four variables are reported 
annually on the Form 990, Schedule D and eventually made public. The panel data used 
in this study includes 996 donor-advised sponsors for years 2007-2016. Our data set also 
includes the Employer Identification Number (EIN), name of the organization, the month 
of the organization’s fiscal year end, and sponsor type: community foundation, single-
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issue charity, or national sponsor. In Table 1, we present the summary statistics for our 
panel data, including the sum, mean, and median values for each of the four key 
variables. 
[Table 1 here] 
 Data completeness 
Because our research aims to understand variation among DAF sponsors, we must 
carefully define the study population and ensure that we have captured all relevant 
organizations. The 996 donor-advised fund sponsors in our panel include all DAF 
sponsors with substantive activity. By comparison, the IRS reported a total of 2,121 DAF 
sponsors in tax year 2012, which were all nonprofits that returned a Schedule D in their 
990 (Arnsberger, 2016). The total reported by the IRS fails to account for the fact that 
many exempt organizations erroneously submit a Schedule D when they do not actually 
operate donor-advised fund accounts and that many small DAF sponsors have little to no 
activity. While our panel has fewer than half of the organizations claiming to operate 
DAFs, it represents almost the entirety of DAF assets reported by the IRS2. 
Using the IRS Form 990 data on donor-advised funds also requires careful 
handling of missing data. Missing data problems take three forms: erroneous information, 
slow reporting, and inconsistent reporting by some organizations in the panel. Some 
missing data result from poor accounting practices, including submitting when not active, 
placing information in the wrong fields, and submitting erroneous values. We drop any 
observation with missing data on all four key variables from all of our analyses. We also 
drop any variables that include clearly erroneous data (e.g. negative payout rates) in 
analyses of those values. Another issue is the timing of when the data is made available, 
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which can take several years in some cases. We are missing about 80% of the data for 
year 2016 because it had not yet been released by the IRS when we collected the data. 
Therefore, we do not include that year in most of the analyses. Finally, to account for 
inconsistent reporting, as well as emerging and discontinued DAFs, we create a balanced 
panel. We conduct most analyses with both the full panel and the balanced panel. We 
present the balanced panel for longitudinal analyses to eliminate organizations that may 
have inconsistent accounting, and to ensure that our results are not due to different panel 
assemblies between years. We use the full set of observations in regressions and other 
analyses when we do not find a significant difference between the balanced and full 
panels. 
Skewness  
One of the unique contributions of this paper is to highlight the skewness of the 
data behind aggregated DAF statistics. This skewness can be clearly seen in Table 1 by 
looking at the means and medians in the summary statistics. For example, in 2015, the 
total value of assets in donor-advised funds was $74.0 billion. The mean was $83 million, 
but this represents roughly the 85th percentile of the distribution; the median DAF only 
held about $5.6 million in assets. The single largest DAF sponsor, Fidelity Charitable, 
held $15.2 billion (21% of the total sum). The ten largest DAFs (top 1.1% of the 
distribution) held $43 billion (58% of the total sum). Two problems result from the 
skewness in the data. First, any patterns in the aggregated statistics will be due to a few 
large organizations. To more accurately represent DAF activity in our analyses, we report 
the statistics for the median organizations whenever possible. Second, highly skewed data 
pose challenges for regression analyses. The outliers unduly leverage any regression line 
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being fit to the rest of the data, and the standard errors of the residuals in regressions are 
not normally distributed. To mitigate these challenges, we use log transformations or 
inverse hyperbolic sine transformations of the variables in most of our regression 
analyses.  
Most DAF analyses in both academic and practitioner literatures use the 
aggregated national totals. Using aggregated statistics to calculate mean averages with 
DAF data can be misleading. For example, the average account size of donor-advised 
funds in 2015 was $278,458, and the average contribution into DAFs was $77,330, when 
calculated using aggregated sums. Looking at all DAF organizations in our sample for 
2015, the range of average account sizes was $251 to $74.4 million and the median was 
$137,923 (half of the average value calculated with aggregated statistics). In 2015, the 
range of average contributions by organization was $3 to $254 million and the median 
value was $21,238 (only 27% of the average calculated with aggregated statistics). Using 
aggregated data, Andreoni (2017) estimated the income of the average DAF user to be 
between $1.4 and 2.2 million, which provided evidence for the claim that DAFs are used 
predominantly by the very wealthy. Using organization-level data leads to a substantially 
different understanding of the typical DAF user. Understanding the skewness of data 
allows researchers and others to more carefully interpret aggregated DAF statistics. 
Methods and Findings 
We approach our analyses of donor-advised funds in an exploratory manner. We 
identify grants as the key variable of interest because understanding DAF granting seems 
to be at the crux of much of the public policy debate. First, we analyze the relationship 
between grants and other DAF variables. We then examine the ratios of grants to assets, 
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known as payout rates, as well as the ratio of grants to contributions, a new metric we call 
flow rate. Lastly, we explore how these key DAF metrics relate to macroeconomic 
indicators.  
Grants, Payout Rates, and Flow Rates 
In 2015, over $13.5 billion was granted to public charities out of DAFs. Sponsor 
grant totals ranged from $0 to $2.8 billion, with a mean of $15.5 million and a median of 
$750,000. Out of 897 observations for that year, only 5 sponsors (less than 1% of the 
population) reported $0 in grants. In the absence of immediate economic incentives, such 
as tax deductions, what factors explain this outflow of money from DAFs to other 
nonprofits? To understand grants coming out of DAFs, we begin by analyzing the 
relationships between grants and the other DAF variables. Figure 2 shows scatter plots of 
grants with the other three variables. There are generally strong and positive correlations 
between the value of grants coming out of DAFs and the value of assets, contributions 
into DAFs, and number of accounts. This is unsurprising. Using organization-level data, 
as the size of an organization increases, so should its activity.  
 [Figure 2 Here]  
To further explore these relationships, we turn to regression analyses of grants 
and related ratios. Grants, contributions, and assets, like many monetary variables, are 
highly skewed. However, a log transformation does not allow for zero values, which are 
present in our data. Therefore, we perform an inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) 
transformation to correct for skewness. The IHS transformation is preferred to a log 
transformation when the skewed variable also includes zeros, because the IHS 
transformation allows for zero and negative values (Burbidge et al. 1988, MacKinnon and 
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Magee 1990, Pence 2006). The IHS transformation is interpreted similarly to a log-log 
transformation.  
Grants 
To understand the variation in grant amounts, we run a regression of grants on the 
other DAF variables – contributions, assets, and number of accounts. Table 2, models 1 
through 3, show that each of the other DAF variables correlates positively and 
significantly with grants, as was observed in the scatter plots in Figure 2. Model 4 shows 
these variables entered into the same model. Each still significantly explains a portion of 
the variance in grants. Model 5 controls for year fixed effects, to account for any major 
events that may cause changes in grant-making and other DAF variables for all 
organizations in a particular year. Model 5 shows that, holding other DAF variables 
constant, a one percent increase in assets yields a 0.41 percent increase in grants; a one 
percent increase in contributions into DAFs yields a 0.35 percent increase in grants out of 
DAFs; and a one percent increase in the number of accounts yields a 0.39 percent 
increase in grants. These simple findings suggest that grants coming out of DAFs are not 
based solely on the amount of assets in the DAF. Other variables, such as the 
contributions coming into the DAFs within the same year, also explain the amount of 
grants going out that year. 
[Table 2 Here]  
Payout Rate  
As discussed above, a common statistic used to describe donor-advised fund 
behavior is the ratio between grants and the asset value – known as the payout rate. The 
payout rate concept is derived from policies regulating private foundations. How this 
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ratio is best calculated for donor-advised funds, and what it means in the donor-advised 
fund context, has been a matter of some debate (Daniels & Lindsay, 2016b; Madoff, 
2014). While the National Philanthropic Trust (2017) uses the same method for 
calculating payout rate as is used by foundations3, Arnsberger (2016) provided a formula 
that indirectly accounts for investment earnings and fees in the calculation of asset value, 
uses data from within the same reporting year4, and generally yields slightly lower rates. 
It will be used for the analyses in this article, because it mitigates problems with missing 
data between years. 
In 2015, a relatively representative year, the median payout rate by DAFs was 
13%, which has remained fairly flat between 2007 and 2015. Out of 849 observations in 
2015, 156 (18% of the sponsors) had payout rates of 5% or less, giving us an indication 
of the minority that grant the same or less than the minimum for private foundations. 
Table 3 depicts the generally flat trend of payout rates, which indicates that grant values 
grow at roughly the same rate as asset values. The exception to the flat payout rates in 
this period is in 2008, when the median payout rate reached 16%. Because 2008 was the 
beginning of an economic recession in the United States, the increase in payout rate 
indicates that further examination of DAF use during recessions is warranted.  
[Table 3. Here] 
Flow Rate 
While payout rate is a useful measure of DAF activity, it only measures the 
relationship of grants to assets, and we know from our regression analyses that grants 
also correlate with contributions. Holding assets constant, grants still change when 
contributions change. In other words, the amount of grantmaking from a DAF sponsor is 
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explained in part by the amount of money coming into a DAF sponsor within the same 
year. This finding means that we cannot think of DAFs as operating like private 
foundations, where the grantmaking is based almost completely on the level of assets. We 
must think of DAFs as a different type of intermediary philanthropic organization.  
To understand DAF operations, we must use measures that capture not only 
grantmaking in relation to assets but also grantmaking in relation to contributions. DAF 
account holders often contribute funds to established DAF accounts, and this activity is 
not captured well by a payout rate. Using an individual example, suppose a donor 
transfers $10,000 of securities into a DAF account that began the year with $2,000, and 
then grants $9,000 out to various charities that same year. Assuming no interest or fees, 
according to the formula above, the payout rate would be $9,000 divided by $2,000, or 
450%. This measure is not a good indicator of how this donor-advised fund was used. 
Another way to look at the same DAF activity would be to consider that a donor 
contributed $10,000 into a DAF account and granted out 90% within the same year. The 
ratio of grants to contributions gauges an important aspect of DAF usage that is not 
measured by payout rate. We call this measure the flow rate and use it at the organization 
level to assess the volume of grant money leaving DAF coiffeurs in relation to the 
volume of DAF money entering DAF coiffeurs within the same year.  
If donor-advised fund sponsors were likened to a reservoir, the flow rate would 
measure the amount of water released by the reservoir as a percentage of the amount of 
water coming into the reservoir. This gives us a sense of the rate at which water is 
flowing through a reservoir. Just as water flowing into a reservoir is not necessarily the 
same water that is flowing out, we are unable to distinguish whether the money being 
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granted from donor-advised funds is the same money as that which is being contributed 
within a given year. Without individual account-level data, it is impossible to use this 
statistic to measure how individuals are using their accounts. If a DAF sponsor has a 90% 
flow rate, the grants may be coming out of different accounts than those receiving 
contributions, but we still get a sense, at the organization level, of the rate at which 
money is coming and going. 
Recent articles and reports about donor-advised funds have begun to use other 
measures of how money is flowing in and out of DAFs, to get a more complete picture of 
DAF usage. Fidelity Charitable claimed that	“three-quarters of donor contribution dollars 
are granted within 5 years” (Fidelity Charitable, 2017). Andreoni’s (2017) “shelf-life” of 
donor-advised fund money estimates that contributions into DAFs for a given year will 
be spent, after all previous moneys are spent, within 3 to 4 years. The flow rate variable is 
limited in its ability to describe all DAF activity, but it gives an additional perspective to 
the common measure of payout rates and is helpful in understanding how DAFs function. 
 The median flow rate in 2015 was 87%. This means that for the median DAF 
sponsor, the value of the grants given out of the organization was 87% of the value of the 
contributions that were made into the organization in that year. It also suggests that about 
13% of the value of contributions is remaining in the organization to be used in the 
future. The median for this statistic has remained fairly flat over the time period of the 
data, except for the year 2009, when it peaked at 103% (see Table 3). This means that in 
2009 the median DAF sponsor gave away more money than it received – another 
indication that DAF activity is different during a recession. 
Differences Across DAF Categories 
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DAFs in the United States range from large national sponsors to small single-
issue charities. It is possible that different types and sizes of DAFs behave differently. 
This section of the analysis looks at how the type and size of DAFs relate to the metrics 
of grants, payout rates, and flow rates. These relationships are important for policy 
makers, as legislation may have distinctive consequences on different types and sizes of 
DAFs. 
Type 
There are three types of donor-advised fund sponsors: community foundations, 
single-issue charities, and national sponsors. We explored how DAF metrics differ by 
sponsor type by regressing grants on the other DAF variables separately for each sponsor 
type (Table 4). We found differing coefficients for each explanatory variable (assets, 
contributions, and number of accounts). We find that an increase in National sponsor 
assets is not associated with a significant increase in grants. Contributions and number of 
accounts do significantly explain differences in granting from National sponsors. This is 
in contrast with community foundations and single-issue charities where increases in all 
three variables are significantly associated with increases in grants. These findings, taken 
together, suggest that national sponsors are not as reliant on or responsive to asset levels 
when making grants. Granting from community foundation DAFs and single-issue DAFs 
is more affected by asset levels, after controlling for contributions and number of 
accounts, suggesting that there may be more of an emphasis on preserving an asset base 
among these sponsors or the donors they work with. 
[Table 4 here] 
Size  
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Not all donor-advised funds are the same size. Some sponsors are extremely large, 
but the vast majority are relatively moderate or small. To analyze how the relationship 
between grants and other DAF variables differs by size, we categorized DAF sponsors 
into three categories: small, medium, and large. We used the median asset value in 2014 
($5.56 million) to differentiate the small and medium DAF organizations. We chose 
2014’s median because we have the most complete data for that year. We defined the 
largest DAF sponsors as those with assets over $1 billion. This group can be thought of 
as outliers. It has very few organizations (less than 1% of all observations) but has the 
potential to influence relationships in the regression analyses.  
When we regressed grants on other DAF variables separately by size category 
(see Table 5), we found that each size group has different relationships between the 
explanatory factors (assets, contributions, or number of accounts) and grants. We found 
that larger DAF sponsors are significantly more responsive to changes in contributions 
than changes in assets. The large sponsors behave similarly to the national sponsors, 
because most (but not all) of the large sponsors are national sponsors. Medium sponsors’ 
grants respond significantly more to changes in assets than do the large sponsors’ grants. 
For both medium and small sponsors, grantmaking increases significantly with increases 
in contributions, assets, and number of accounts. Again, we find that donor-advised funds 
sponsors are not granting solely based on assets and that there is significant variation 
between different sizes of sponsors. 
 [Table 5. Here] 
Payout Rates and Flow Rates by Type and Size. 
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Knowing that type and size affect the relationship between grants other DAF 
variables, we also explored categorical effects on the metrics of payout rates and flow 
rates. If we track payout rates and flow rates over time, we see differing trends in each 
category. Figure 3 shows the longitudinal trends of the median payout and flow rates 
from a balanced panel of organizations by type and size. In Figure 3(a) we see that 
community foundations have consistently lower payout rates, and Figure 3(b) shows that 
single-issue charities have consistently higher flow rates. Figure 3(c) displays 
consistently higher payout rates among large organizations. We tested categorical 
differences in the metrics with pooled quantile (median) regressions of the payout rates 
and flow rates by size and sponsor type and found that each of these differences was 
significant at the 0.05 level. (Appendices A1 and A2).  Figure 3(d) shows a peak in flow 
rates among all sizes in 2008-2009 (an indicator of the economy’s influence on flow 
rates), with flow rates dropping more substantially among large organizations in later 
years.  
[Figure 3 Here] 
DAF Activity and the Economy  
 We have already noted that payout rates and flow rates both peaked during 
recession periods with fiscal year ends in 2008 and 2009. Median payout rates peaked in 
2008 at 16%, and median flow rates peaked in 2009 at 103%. Two patterns help explain 
these phenomena. First, by all measures – sum total, median, and means – grants actually 
increase in fiscal year 2008 (see Table 1), during an economic recession. Contrast this 
phenomenon with the drop in overall charitable giving from individuals and private 
foundations during this same year (Reich & Wimer, 2012). The increase in the value of 
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grants going out of DAFs, however, corresponded with a decrease in both the value of 
contributions coming into DAFs and asset values. These conditions led to the highest 
ever payout rate among donor-advised funds. The second pattern, which helps to explain 
the increase in flow rates, is that grants out of DAFs did not drop as much as 
contributions between 2008 and 2009 (see Table 1). During the first two years of the 
recession, 2008 and 2009, contributions dropped substantially each year – similar to the 
decreases in all charitable giving (Reich & Wimer, 2012). While grants did decrease from 
2008 to 2009, they only decreased by 7% of the aggregate total, compared to a 36% 
decrease in contributions into DAFs.  
In order to more deeply explore how DAF activities relate to the economy, we 
merged the panel data with specific macroeconomic indicators that are known to correlate 
with other forms of charitable giving: GDP, the S&P 500 index, Consumer Confidence 
Index (CCI), and unemployment rates5 (List & Peysakhovich, 2011; Parth, Wilhelm, 
Rooney, & Brown, 2003). Our measure of GDP came from Macroeconomic Advisers 
(2017), the S&P 500 index numbers came from Cboe (2017), the Consumer Confidence 
index from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2017), and 
unemployment statistics from Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017). We used monthly 
statistics from 2007 to 2016 for each indicator because sponsor organizations had 
different months for their fiscal year end. If a sponsor reported their fiscal year end as 
September, the economic factors merged with that sponsor’s data were for the month of 
September in each year. In this way, changes in the economy and changes in DAF 
metrics are aligned by month to reduce unintended lagged effects.  
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 First, we scrutinized a correlation matrix of the macroeconomic indicators and 
DAF variables (Appendix A3) to detect patterns in significant correlations (see List & 
Peysakhovich, 2011). We found that changes in contributions into DAFs correlated 
significantly with changes in the GDP, and changes in asset values correlated 
significantly with changes in the S&P 500 index. DAF grants, interestingly, did not 
correlate with either of these economic variables. Because GDP and the S&P 500 seemed 
to be the most influential correlates with DAF activity, we used those two 
macroeconomic factors as our indicators for recession conditions. We coded dummy 
variables for 12 month periods in which the GDP had a negative change (GDP recession) 
or a positive change (GDP growth), and likewise for the S&P 500 index. Note that GDP 
and the S&P index do not follow each other exactly. So, there are 12 month periods when 
one may increase while the other decreases. We track both to see if DAF activity may be 
more sensitive to one or the other indicator. 
In Figure 4, we present the Kernel density plots of the three DAF metrics of 
interest (grants, payout rates, and flow rates) during periods of economic growth and 
recession (measured by GDP and S&P). Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show the distribution of 
the percent changes in grants during years with different economic conditions. During 
recessions (blue dotted line), organizations do not dramatically change grantmaking. The 
shift to the left in the distribution of percent changes in granting during GDP recessions 
indicates that a slightly larger proportion of sponsors had decreases in grantmaking 
during recessions. Looking at payout rates in both Figures 4(c) and 4(d), the shift to the 
right in the distribution indicates that, during both GDP and S&P recessions, substantially 
more sponsors had large payout rates above 15 or 20 percent. For flow rates, shown in 
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Figures 4(e) and 4(f), the flattening of the distribution and shift towards the right also 
indicates substantially more sponsors with higher flow rates during the recession. In the 
GDP recession graph, there is a marked increase in the proportion of sponsors with flow 
rates above 100 percent, which indicates that these organizations were granting more than 
they received in contributions. These distributions begin to suggest that donor-advised 
fund granting stayed largely consistent during the recession, despite changing economic 
conditions and organizational inputs.  
[Figure 4 Here] 
We next test if these changes during recession conditions vary by sponsor type 
and size and are statistically significant. We begin by running t-tests for the differences of 
means in the percent changes in our three DAF metrics during economic growth versus 
recession. We then analyze these differences according to the size and type of the sponsor 
organizations (Appendices A4, and A5). Overall, average grants during GDP recession 
are 4.5 percentage points less than average grants during GDP growth. They are not 
significantly different in S&P recession. Average payout rates are 2.1 percentage points 
and 0.9 percentage points higher during GDP and S&P recessions respectively. Likewise, 
flow rates are 12.1 percentage points and 3.4 percentage points higher during GDP and 
S&P recessions respectively. Of the three sponsor types, community foundations had the 
largest percentage decrease in grants (in GDP recessions) and the largest increase in 
payout and flow rates (in both GDP and S&P recessions). Only the changes in 
community foundations were significant at the 0.05 level. National sponsors and single-
issue charities had overall increases in their rates, but had so much variance, the changes 
were not significant. When looking at size groups, the medium-sized DAFs were the only 
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group where payout rates were significantly higher in both forms of recession. The most 
striking changes were the average flow rates in the large ($1B+ in assets) sponsors, which 
were 50 percentage points and 30 percentage points higher during GDP and S&P 
recessions, respectively. The higher flow rates among large DAF sponsors during 
recession indicate that large DAFs are granting more from contributions than from assets. 
Finally, we ask whether the changes in DAF metrics (grants, payout rates, and 
flow rates) differ according to the magnitude of the changes in the economy. For each 
level of change in the economy in our data, we calculate the point estimates for percent 
change in grants and the point estimates for payout rate and flow rate. Figure 5 shows the 
point estimates and 95% confidence intervals, which vary in width based on the number 
of observations (and to a lesser extent the variation) at each level of recession. The figure 
shows different patterns of DAF activity for recession and growth conditions. The non-
parametric regression displayed in these figures adds additional insight to our t-test 
results. In the t-test, most of the recession periods measured were severe recessions, while 
many of the growth years were minor growth years, leading to a larger difference in 
grants.  
[Figure 5 Here] 
 We see in Figure 5 that the point estimates for changes in grants are actually 
higher during slight GDP recessions (but with much larger confidence intervals), and that 
increases in grants are also present during the smallest decreases in S&P. As recessions 
are more severe, there is a trend for grants to also decrease. However, many of these 
changes are not significant, and the most severe GDP recession still has a positive point 
estimate for changes in grants, though it is not significant at the .05 level. This suggests 
	 59	
that donors' grantmaking is affected by the severity of recessions, but the relationship 
may not be linear. It is important to note that in slight recessions, the assets are still 
contracting, thus an increase in grants is countercyclical to what would be expected. 
Payout rates seem to increase with more severe recessions, which is explained by greater 
drops in asset levels, but relatively smaller drops in granting. Flow rates seem to follow a 
similar, but less dramatic, pattern, signaling that the contributions are not dropping as 
much as assets during more severe recessions. What we learn from these analyses is that 
DAF granting differs according to the magnitude of changes in the economy. Overall, we 
see donor-advised fund sponsors continued to distribute money in a way that was resilient 
to the economic downturn. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This article introduces donor-advised funds, reviews some main issues salient to 
public policy discussions, and presents some of the first organizational-level analyses 
from a sample that approaches the full, active population. The new data provided in this 
article pulls back the curtain on the mostly aggregate numbers that we have hitherto seen 
in the reports and articles about donor-advised funds. We are beginning to understand the 
complexity and heterogeneity of this increasingly important subset of nonprofit 
organizations. 
One of the main contributions of this paper is the statistical evidence for 
heterogeneity among various types and sizes of DAF sponsors. Much attention has been 
given to the largest DAF sponsors, such as Fidelity, Vanguard, Schwab, and National 
Philanthropic Trust. It is readily apparent that the activities of such organizations 
dominate the national trends. It is almost impossible to talk about “normal” donor-
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advised funds by looking at national sums, because they are strongly influenced by the 
largest sponsors. By segregating these larger organizations in our analysis, we can study 
the other 99% of donor-advised funds more effectively. This work highlights the 
skewness of DAF data and contributes to researchers’ ability to more accurately analyze 
and discuss them. We hope that future discussions about donor-advised funds will no 
longer assume that the “average” DAF sponsor is just a smaller version of Fidelity 
Charitable. We see from our data that smaller and medium donor-advised fund sponsors 
behave differently than the large ones, and community foundations, single-issue charities 
and national sponsors each behave differently. 
Using organization-level data also uncovers evidence that donor-advised funds 
are a more mainstream philanthropic vehicle than some have suggested. Our data 
suggests a lower average account level than was previous supposed from the aggregate 
data (c.f. Andreoni, 2017). This is supported by evidence that the number of DAF 
accounts is rapidly increasing. National Philanthropic Trust found a 60% increase in the 
number of donor-advised fund accounts in 2017 and a 20% decrease in the average 
account balance (National Philanthropic Trust, 2018). Callahan’s (2017) book about 
ultra-wealthy philanthropists suggests that DAFs are a tool for the wealthy to circumvent 
regulations around private foundations. The Economist (2017) also suggested that donor-
advised funds are primarily a tax saving vehicle for the philanthropy of the extremely 
wealthy. While DAFs may be used to maximize tax advantages among elite wealth 
holders, we find evidence suggesting DAF proliferation among a broader base of 
charitable donors.  
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Our findings also suggest that DAF sponsors behave differently than private 
foundations and require different metrics. Median and average payout rates are multiple 
times higher than the 5-6% that private foundations pay out. In addition, DAF grants are 
correlated closely with contributions. To measure this distinct phenomenon, we introduce 
the flow rate metric, which we hope will lead to a more sophisticated understanding of 
donor-advised funds. While payout rates are a critical measure of DAF activity, payout 
rates do not fully or accurately describe the continual flow of money through donor-
advised funds. Focusing on payout rates misguidedly equates donor-advised funds, which 
make grants using a combination of contributions and assets, with private foundations, 
which generally make grants using endowment earnings.  
Much of the concern around donor-advised funds focuses on the fact that once 
money is placed into a DAF account, there is no guarantee that money will be 
redistributed (Daniels, 2015, Daniels & Lindsay, 2016b, Madoff, 2016b). Many reform 
advocates fear that money will stagnate in donor-advised funds. When considering our 
findings on this topic, it is important to reiterate that the data and analyses in this article 
cannot be used to directly address the individual use of donor advised funds. While our 
findings describe organizational behavior, they cannot describe how individuals use 
DAFs. Inferring patters of individual behavior from ecological data, such as 990 returns, 
involves multiple assumptions that cannot be supported by the data currently available on 
donor-advised funds (King, 1997). Andreoni (2017) suggested that, from a public policy 
perspective, one should focus on the aggregate activities, not individual accounts. While 
the individuals may benefit from the tax advantages of donating to donor-advised funds, 
the onus is on DAF sponsors to maintain a charitable purpose for their exempt status. 
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When we analyze organizational-level DAF activity, we observe that DAF 
grantmaking is relatively robust when compared to DAF assets and contributions. The 
median payout rate is approximately 13%, indicating that funds for DAF grantmaking are 
not generated solely from interest earnings. Median flow rates of 87% suggest that donor-
advised funds act as pass-through philanthropic intermediaries, not as long-term parking 
lots for charitable dollars. The rise of asset levels seems to be driven by the remainder left 
in the accounts combined with compound interest. While researchers and policymakers 
would ultimately like to know to what extent these patterns hold for individual DAF 
accounts, these organization-level patterns are valuable because they can help researchers 
and policymakers to compare DAFs to other nonprofit grantmaking institutions. 
We also found that different types of sponsor organizations behave differently. 
These differences in donor-advised funds sponsors presumably reflect the differences in 
clientele across the organizations. Community foundation DAFs act more like 
grantmaking foundations than other DAF sponsors. This suggests that those who use 
community foundations take a more grant-on-earnings approach than those who use other 
types of DAF sponsors. Community foundations significantly decreased their grants 
during recessions, following the pattern of private foundations. Single-issue charities had 
the highest flow rates, suggesting that they operate more as pass-through intermediaries, 
functioning to liquidate assets and then distribute those assets quickly to related 
charitable entities. More research will have to drill down on the various groups and 
subgroups of donor-advised funds. For example, how do religious donor-advised funds 
differ from other single-issue charities? Or how do urban community foundation DAFs 
differ from those in rural communities? In regards to size, we see that smaller sponsors 
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tend to have higher flow rates. Larger sponsors, however, have higher payout rates. These 
patterns suggest that regulations meant to control payout rates would primarily affect 
DAFs with smaller assets. 
Our final analysis of donor-advised activities during recession conditions is 
perhaps the most important contribution of this paper, when considering their place in the 
nonprofit sector and society as a whole. Giving from foundations decreased as readily as 
individual giving during the recession years of 2008-2009 (Reich & Wimer, 2012), when 
nonprofits needed the money the most. During this time, donors with money in donor-
advised fund accounts were uniquely positioned to continue to support the causes they 
cared about. Our findings suggest that grantmaking from donor-advised funds is less 
affected by economic recession than other forms of charitable giving. More research will 
be needed to understand what charities benefit from this DAF recession giving. 
Furthermore, policy makers may want to carefully consider the recession-resilient nature 
of donor-advised funds as they formulate regulation for this growing form of 
philanthropy. 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
1	The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation granted $4.5 billion, and DAF grants from 
Fidelity Charitable totaled $3.5 billion (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2017; Fidelity 
Charitable, 2017a). 
	
2	The IRS reported that all DAF sponsors had a combined asset value of $52.9 billion for 
that 2012 tax year, and the sample for this study has a combined asset value of $56.8 
billion for fiscal year 2013. The difference is due to the panel data being organized by 
fiscal year instead of tax year (calendar year), as well as some IRS file error as noted by 
Arnsberger (2016). 
	
3	NPT divides grants in a given year by the year-end assets of the previous year. 
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4	Arnsberger divides grants in a given year by the year-end asset value in the same year 
plus the grants for that year minus the contributions that year. 
	
5	GDP and S&P 500 are inflation adjusted to 2012 dollars, and unemployment rates are 
seasonally adjusted.  
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Abstract 
Donor-advised funds (DAFs) are changing the way that many people make charitable 
donations to nonprofit organizations. Instead of giving cash or assets directly to a charity, 
donors opt to use a donor-advised fund account, or “giving account,” as a philanthropic 
intermediary. Recent proliferation of DAF usage has led to suggestions of tighter 
regulations on this increasingly common form of philanthropy. This article reviews the 
concerns around the growth of donor-advised funds and the related policy proposals 
suggested by reformers. With consideration for the historical precedents of governing 
philanthropic action and nonprofit organizations, I recommend a relatively conservative 
approach to regulating donor-advised funds. Policy recommendations include minimum 
requirements that would match regulations for charitable trusts, increase reporting, and 
close loopholes that DAFs create for private foundations. The policy recommendations 
are intended to maintain public trust in American philanthropy, preserve freedom for 
individuals who wish to donate to charity, while promoting the best interests for the 
nonprofit sector as a whole.   
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Introduction 
 
What makes donor-advised funds such a pressing public policy issue is the recent rapidity 
of their growth. Over a thousand nonprofit organizations sponsor donor-advised funds, 
and almost half a million Americans are now using them to make donations (National 
Philanthropic Trust, 2018). Donor-advised funds emerged in the early twentieth century 
and started becoming more popular after the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (TRA) (Berman, 
2015). Over the last ten years, however, the number of DAF accounts has almost tripled – 
from 156,620 in 2007 to 463,622 in 2017 (National Philanthropic Trust, 2018). Figure 1 
shows the growth in assets, contributions and grants. The expansion of DAFs is largely 
due to financial service providers, such as Fidelity Investments, which have entered the 
charitable market with their own nonprofit subsidiaries, expanding this philanthropic 
service to their broad client bases.  
 
 [Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The growth of DAF’s is “changing the landscape” of American Philanthropy, leading to 
new forms of charitable organizations (Daniels & Lindsay, 2016). In 2017 alone, the 
number of users jumped 60% (National Philanthropic Trust, 2018), largely due to the 
advent of a new type of sponsor, which uses DAFs to facilitate workplace giving (see 
Figure 2). For example, Benevity is a B-Corporation that partners with large 
multinationals such as Microsoft and Coca-Cola to facilitate workplace giving through its 
own donor-advised fund (Ebeling, 2018). These new users represent a younger, more 
mainstream population of givers. More and more Americans, even the less wealthy, are 
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giving through a DAF account. In 2017, DAFs received $29 billion in contributions, 
representing more than 10% of all individual giving. Donor-advised funds are beginning 
to rival private foundations in financial influence in the nonprofit sector. Total assets 
under management at DAFs have grown to over $110 billion, and in 2017 DAFs granted 
over $19 billion - almost 40% of the amount of money that private foundations granted 
(National Philanthropic Trust, 2018). Amidst the change, policy makers question whether 
more regulations are needed. 
 [Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Reform advocates have raised several reasons for concern about this meteoric growth. 
These concerns involve three core issues: 1) the timing of donations made through DAFs, 
2) transparency in giving through DAFs, and 3) the costs of DAFs to the public sector. 
This article will analyze each of these concerns within the context of public policy history 
relating to nonprofits and philanthropy.  Frumkin (2006) described how changes in public 
policy towards nonprofits can have unintended consequences. The purpose of the paper is 
to address the critical concerns around donor-advised funds and make policy suggestions 
considering the best interest of the nonprofit sector as a whole. 
 
Historical Context 
 
In 1969, Congress singled out private foundations as philanthropic organizations that 
needed to be regulated more closely because of their rising prominence and influence in 
society. Legislators determined that if wealthy individuals were going to have subsidized 
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influence over society the public needed more accountability (Hall, 2006). Rules were 
established to control tax benefits for contributing to private foundations; a mandatory 
payout rate was designed to ensure granting that would keep pace with interest earnings; 
and more stringent reporting requirements were enacted. Berman (2015) explained that 
during this time, a tax attorney named Norm Sugarman recognized the benefits that TRA 
offered public charities and began advocating ways that community foundations, 
especially Jewish organizations, could benefit from the new law. He counseled 
community foundations to use their public charity status to attract the money of wealth 
philanthropist, while allowing them to maintain some control over their donations. The 
new arrangements were eventually formalized with a private-letter ruling from the IRS 
which allow the donors informal control, giving donors privileges to “recommend” or 
“advise” the community foundations in how to use their philanthropic contributions. 
These informal compacts eventually became what we now know as donor-advised funds 
(Berman, 2015).  
 
In the early 90’s, Fidelity Investments created its own version of the donor-advised fund 
by establishing a public charity subsidiary knows as Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund. The 
affiliate provided its clients a public charity option for directing donations that avoided 
the regulations on private foundations – a convenient way to facilitate charitable gifts and 
still keep the investments with the firm. The exempt status of these commercially 
sponsored charities, also known as National Sponsor Organizations (NSOs) was 
challenged by the IRS during the 90’s. The courts ultimately decided in favor of the 
NSOs, granting them tax-exempt status as public charities (Colinvaux, 2017). The 
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decision reaffirmed the historically broad definition of charitable purpose. This common 
law ruling and the increasing popularity of donor-advised funds led other financial-
service providers, as well as many other community foundations and various charities to 
start their own DAFs as well. What’s important about this historical context is the fact 
that donor-advised funds rose in large measure as a response to a piece of legislation that 
was considered to be adversarial towards the sector. The regulations pushed donors to 
find alternative ways to direct private philanthropy to preferred causes without costly 
regulations. It is important to ask ourselves, how would donors respond to additional 
policy regulating the use of donor-advised funds?  
 
Frumkin (2006) argued that the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1969 led to unintended 
consequences on the way that private foundations make grants for social purposes. In 
response to more demanding regulations, private foundations professionalized and 
bureaucratized their staff. This response led to higher administrative costs, meaning less 
money for charitable recipients. Private foundations strengthened their professional 
associations with each other in order to respond to regulation in a unified manner. This 
formal association led to more homogenized approaches to grantmaking, involving fewer 
transformative gifts and more, smaller, programmatic grants. Frumkin (2006) concluded 
that these associational responses to TRA led to private foundations becoming more rigid 
in their philanthropic activity, and thus less responsive to addressing large societal 
problems. 
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What approach should be taken when considering policies for donor-advised funds? In 
her book Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law and Regulation, 
Fremont-Smith (2004) advocated regulating nonprofits sufficiently to ensure public trust, 
but restrainedly as to allow maximum freedom. She wrote: 
The wise course, therefore, is to provide a sufficient degree of regulation of 
charities to assure the public of the integrity of the sector, yet that it not be so 
draconian as to limit its freedom to meet changing needs…. 
[The nonprofit sector] must be allowed the greatest degree of freedom to operate, 
consistent with the need to assure the public of its integrity. (p.2) 
Regarding the long history of government-nonprofit relations, Fremont-Smith (2004) 
emphasized that government has generally taken a hands-off approach, so long as 
nonprofit fiduciaries can maintain a position of trust with the public. The definition of 
“public good” has traditionally been treated in the broadest sense from a public policy 
standpoint. Government has extended to the nonprofit sector the freedom to generate 
public goods in a multiplicity of ways, resulting in a plurality of causes, without 
prescribing exactly what qualifies as charitable.   
 
In the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Congress formally identified donor-advised funds 
as a particular form of exempt organizations and began to require more reporting from 
DAF sponsors. Specifically, they introduced the Schedule D into Form 990, which 
requires the reporting of the number of accounts, aggregated contributions, aggregated 
grants, and total asset value. In addition, DAF sponsors also report a list of grants made 
to other charitable organizations on Schedule I. This initial regulation of donor-advised 
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funds was designed primarily to increase accountability and transparency. It did not at all 
alter the tax treatment of donor-advised fund contributions, which is currently identical to 
other public charities. Whether donor-advised funds continue to enjoy relative freedom, 
or whether they will be more tightly regulated is a matter of debate. This article will 
review the major concerns about donor-advised funds and some potential regulations to 
address those concerns, while trying to maintain as Fremont-Smith (2004, p. 2) put it, 
“the greatest freedom to operate.”  
 
Concerns of Reform Advocates 
Several authors as well as legislators have raised important critiques of donor-advised 
funds and called for reform in their treatment under the tax code (Andreoni, 2018; 
Callahan, 2017; Colinvaux, 2017, 2018; Gelles, 2018; Hussey, 2010; Madoff 2014, 
2016a, 2016b; Sherlock & Gravelle, 2012). These critiques have coalesced around three 
key concerns. The first concern is about timing. Contributions to donor-advised funds are 
immediately tax-deductible, but there is no guarantee that the money will be granted in a 
timely manner to other public charities. The second concern is that DAFs create a 
transparency loophole for grants from private foundations. The third concern is that 
donor-advised funds offer their users distinct tax advantages, resulting in greater losses in 
public revenues than other forms of giving. Addressing these concerns from a public 
policy standpoint requires the consideration of how possible regulation of donor-advised 
funds would affect the entire nonprofit sector. 
 
 
	 78	
1. The Timing Issue. 
Nonprofits generally prefer outright donations that are immediately spendable. Needs for 
services are ever present, and financial demands are constant for most charities. 
Sometimes nonprofits will set aside money in the form of an endowment, and only use 
the interest from investments for operating expenses. Donor-advised funds are 
somewhere in between these two models, and sometimes don’t fit either. Money that is 
contributed to a donor-advised fund has no prescription for when it will be used. Each 
donor decides when to make a grant out of his or her account. Like outright donations, 
money can be given through a donor-advised fund to another charity almost immediately. 
Like endowments, the money in donor-advised funds is invested, and the earnings are 
available for distribution to charitable purposes. But unlike either of these two models, 
money in a donor-advised fund could, theoretically, sit in the account earning interest 
indefinitely. This is the problem. Madoff (2016b, p. 2) succinctly apprised, “Since federal 
law doesn’t require DAF funds to ever be distributed, there’s no way to be sure the 
money in them will ever flow to charities.” While contributions to donor-advised funds 
are irrevocable, and can only be redistributed to a public charity, there is no guarantee for 
when that will happen. 
 
Several public policies have been suggested for how to deal with this problem. Some 
have suggested a minimum payout rate, similar to to private foundations, but this idea has 
some critical flaws when examined closely. Madoff (2016a) pointed out that the 
minimum payout was designed for private foundations with the idea of perpetuity in 
mind, and that donor-advised funds are not necessarily intended to exist in perpetuity. 
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Current payout rates from donor-advised funds sponsors are generally well above the 5% 
mark, which is the bright-line requirement for private foundations, with the median 
payout rate hovering around 13% over the past ten years (Heist & Vance-McMullen, 
2019). This figure is measured per organization, not each individual account, and thus 
represents an aggregate of many accounts in one.  
 
Colinvaux (2017) proposed that such a minimum be imposed only on the commercially 
affiliated NSOs, recognizing that most of the other DAF sponsor organizations, such as 
community foundations, exist for charitable purposes outside of hosting DAFs. The 
minimum payout (at whatever rate) would be enforced by commercial sponsors on its 
individual account holders to meet the minimum standard. NSOs serve no other 
charitable purpose than to redistribute charitable money, and this would ensure that they 
meet a “commensurate test” used to determine if a fundraising organization is adequately 
fulfilling its charitable purpose (Colinvaux, 2017). Applying this regulation to NSOs 
would protect the majority of sponsors such as community foundations and single-issue 
charities from having to comply, but would affect the majority of DAF users. National 
Sponsor Organizations serve a vast majority, 338,141 of the 463,622 account holders 
(National Philanthropic Trust, 2018).  Such a regulation would artificially incentivize 
many donors to use community foundations or single-issue charities. Those who would 
be most likely to move accounts would be those least likely to meet a minimum 
requirement. Heist and Vance-McMullen (2019) found that community foundations and 
single-issue charities already have historically lower payout rates than NSOs. How would 
the migration of lower-rate DAF users to other charities improve the usefulness of DAFs 
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to the nonprofit sector?  For those who would keep their DAF accounts at an NSO, the 
imposition of a minimum payout rate would likely diminish their flow of charitable 
dollars, because they would use the minimum as an anchor in their charitable decision 
making. Rooney (2017) explained that “a minimum payout rate for DAFs likely would 
ossify the minimum into a new maximum as well—essentially causing, in other words, a 
new standard of minimal compliance.” So, the minimum payout rate regulation would be 
counterproductive to the way that donor-advised funds are used. 
 
Another similar idea came from David Camp in 2014, then Chairman of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, to impose a five-year payout period for when donations need to 
be redistributed. This idea strikes more of a balance in maintaining some flexibility for 
DAF users, while addressing the concern about money sitting in the account indefinitely. 
Andreoni (2017) analyzed aggregated DAF data, and calculated a “shelf-life” for how 
long money turns over at the organization level. He found that on the aggregate it takes 
between 3 and 4 years for DAF sponsors to redistribute their moneys, taking a first-in 
first-out approach. Again, the organizational data indicates that DAFs are out-performing 
even this seemingly reasonable request. Heist and Vance-McMullen (2019) found that 
money flows fairly consistently through donor-advised fund sponsors. When comparing 
the value of grants being distributed by DAFs to the value of contributions being received 
by DAFs, year-over-year, the median “flow-rate” is about 85%. This suggests that if the 
median DAF sponsor receives $1 M in contributions in a given year, then it will give out 
$850,000 in grants that same year.  
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While these proposed regulations are well intended, after considering the empirical 
evidence of how DAFs are being used, they seem a bit excessive. Implementing a 
universal regulation for all DAF holders to ensure that money is being redistributed in a 
timely manner, when the current data imply that DAF money is already flowing at a 
reasonable rate overreaches the intended outcome. As the proverbial axiom goes, “if it’s 
not broken, don’t fix it.” Fremont-Smith (2004) emphasized “[The nonprofit sector] must 
be allowed the greatest degree of freedom to operate, consistent with the need to assure 
the public of its integrity.” The aggregate data indicate that collectively speaking DAF 
users are not abusing the flexibility of time allotted to them, but are gifting money out of 
their donor-advised funds at reasonable rates and speed (Heist & Vance-McMullen, 
2019). 
 
Because the aggregate data does not represent individual behavior, consideration must be 
given to those individuals who are outliers and do not follow the average organizational 
behaviors. There is still a chance that some people are parking charitable dollars in 
donor-advised funds, with no immediate intention for redistribution to charitable causes. 
In fact, I have interviewed such DAF users, and found evidence that some people leave 
money in DAF accounts with no plan for when to move it out. Why is it a problem? Even 
though contributions into DAFs are irrevocable, the donations are subsidized by the 
deductibility of the gift, and require some level of accountability to the public that the 
money will be used to generate public goods. Private foundations are allowed to exist in 
perpetuity, but they have a minimum payout to ensure that some money flows to the 
public. With donor-advised funds, one could establish an account in perpetuity, with no 
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requirement for any public benefit. The trick is to figure out a policy that prevents this 
situation without impairing the charitable behavior of the vast majority of DAF givers. 
 
Part of the solution lies within the sector itself. The nonprofit sector has a history of 
employing self-regulation policies to promote best practices and cultivate public trust 
(Brody, 2006). Hale (2013) wrote that formal regulation of nonprofits may not be suitable 
to the public’s true concerns and that “normative sector values, such as trust and 
collaboration” may be the best motivating force for improved nonprofit performance.  
In a comparative analysis of European countries, Bies (2010) found that nonprofit self-
regulation occurs where the sector is well established, but also found a professional type 
of self-regulation in emerging nonprofit sectors where the legal systems are also 
emerging. According to Institutional Theory, professional types of self-regulation enact 
values-based policies designed to generate normative behavior meant to engender trust in 
the organization (Bies, 2010). Given that DAFs are an emerging subsector in the United 
States and that the legal regime relating specifically to DAFs is also emerging, we can 
expect to find professional forms of self-regulation. For example, Fidelity Charitable 
requires donors to grant a minimum average of 5% of assets annually over a five-year 
rolling period. If this is not met, then Fidelity Charitable distributes money out of the 
account in order to meet their own minimum requirement (Fidelity Charitable, 2018). Not 
all sponsors have such a policy at this point, and legislation aimed at organizations could 
be used to encourage or nudge them to adopt such policies. 
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In determining what public policies would be appropriate to address the issue of 
perpetuity without payout, two considerations should guide the process. The first 
consideration has already been covered in large measure. That is, whatever policy is 
implemented, this policy would be meant to control the few outliers that breach the 
normal standard of redistributing DAF money for public use in reasonable time. It would 
not be a policy for the average DAF user, but rather a stopgap for relatively few. The 
second consideration is that we already have laws that govern similar forms of charitable 
giving. Any regulation of DAFs that supersedes those imposed on other philanthropic 
entities may be taken as unfair and punitive, and may merely shift behavior to other 
charitable forms, just as the Tax Reform Act of 1969 inadvertently catalyzed the growth 
of DAFs. 
 
Tax-exempt charitable entities can take either of two basic forms: charitable trusts or 
nonprofit corporations. The legal regimes governing both forms have the same intent – to 
ensure charitable purposes and prohibit private inurement. Technically, donor-advised 
funds sponsors are chartered as nonprofit corporations, but in practice they operate 
similar to charitable trusts. Any regulation of donor-advised funds could be compared 
with the treatment of charitable trusts, to determine fairness and propriety. In regard to 
the timing issues, how is timing treated in charitable trusts? Many charitable trusts allow 
a separation in timing between the tax-deductibility and the distribution of money for 
public purposes. Split-interest trusts, such as charitable remainder unitrust (CRUTs), 
provide a tax-advantaged contribution up front (prorated depending on the life of the 
donor and the terms of the trust), and make the charitable distribution at the termination 
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of the trust (usually the life of the donor). Comparing donor-advised funds to a charitable 
remainder trusts, both are irrevocable and enjoy immediate tax advantages. DAF donors 
receive no payments from split-interest, but do enjoy the flexibility of choosing multiple 
charitable recipients at multiple periods of time. The one feature that DAFs lack, that 
make CRUTs legally viable, is an ultimate remainder beneficiary. Should DAFs be 
required to name a remainder beneficiary and an ultimate term of expiration, such as the 
life of the donor, then the legal regimes governing the two forms would be equitable.  
 
By establishing a lifetime term limit for donor-advised funds with a remainder 
beneficiary, we answer the concern about when the money will be used for public 
purposes. We do not accept a minimum payout, but we also remove the possibility of 
perpetuity. We leave to the donor to decide, within his/her lifetime, when to designate the 
irrevocable gift for its ultimate purpose. Some may argue that it is wiser to spend 
charitable dollars in the present, when the needs are immediate. However, the strategic 
decision of when to use philanthropic resources is a matter of personal philosophy about 
social needs, involves the discounting of the future value of money, makes projections 
about investment growth and predictions about future needs (Frumkin, 2006). Indeed, the 
question of timing is as much a matter personal choice as any aspect of philanthropic 
activity. Brody (2006) stated: “The absolute discretion of a donor to give or withhold 
making a charitable gift—with whatever conditions the donor imposes—is, to some, the 
essence of private philanthropy.” This essence of private philanthropy, the freedom to 
choose when and how to give, has traditionally been given wide latitude under various 
legal regimes. There is no good reason why donor-advised funds should be any different. 
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2. The Transparency Issue. 
One feature of donor-advised funds that makes them attractive to some donors, tricky to 
manage for many development officers, and concerning for reform advocates is the 
ability to give anonymously through a donor-advised fund. When donors establish DAF 
accounts, they name them. Some name the account after themselves, some take the 
opportunity to honor a beloved family member, and some use indistinctive titles, such as 
“The Doing Good Fund.” No matter what the name of the account, giving through a 
philanthropic intermediary adds a layer of separation between the donor and the nonprofit 
recipient. This creates challenges for nonprofit managers and fundraisers. Moreover, even 
those whose accounts reflect their own names may choose to make some of their grants 
anonymously, which will withhold any identifying information from the charity. 
Technically, it is the sponsor organization that is making the grant. While this creates 
additional challenges for the grantees, it should not be considered illegal.  
 
For individual donors, donor-advised funds offer a more strategic way to regulate their 
direct acknowledgement and involvement with charities. Some donors do not want to be 
known for differing reasons. They may value the principle of anonymity from an ethical 
or moral perspective. Anonymity has long been praised as a virtuous aspect of charitable 
giving (i.e. Maimonides’ eight levels of Tzedakah). They may not want to be constantly 
solicited by nonprofits, which happens when people become known for making large 
donations. So donor-advised funds offer a service to individual donors who desire less 
transparency around their giving. Individual donors already enjoy the right to give 
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directly to a nonprofit and keep that donation anonymous. Charities have the right to 
maintain the confidentiality of their donors, and do not have to report who donated to 
them. DAFS merely facilitate anonymity. Requiring individuals or DAF sponsors to 
disclose all donations would be overreaching the current regulations of charitable giving 
and raise serious ethical questions for those who value anonymity.  
 
While we want to protect the freedoms of individuals, other entities that donate through 
donor-advised funds may not warrant that same level of freedom. As Madoff (2014) and 
Callahan (2017) have pointed out, private foundations are able to funnel money through 
donor-advised funds anonymously, thus defeating one part of the regulations governing 
them. One of the purposes of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was to demand greater 
accountability and transparency from private philanthropists who could yield significant 
influence in society through publicly sanctioned foundations. The idea was to inform the 
public on what causes private foundations support. Donor-advised funds offer private 
foundations a loophole for this transparency regulation. Technically, a private foundation 
can grant to a DAF first, then to another charity, and only report the grant to the DAF 
sponsor, while the public remains uninformed about the ultimate recipient. Clearly this is 
a breach of the standing legal structures governing private philanthropy. Future public 
policy needs to close this loophole by disallowing private foundations the ability to grant 
to donor-advised funds. 
 
Related to this transparency loophole, donor-advised funds also offer private foundations 
an out for meeting their minimum payout rate. Madoff (2014) explained, “Adding to the 
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problem is that private foundations can meet their 5-percent payout rule simply by 
transferring money to donor-advised funds rather than giving to real charities.” I have 
interviewed philanthropists with private foundations who use the DAF as an “overflow” 
fund during years when their foundations do not have enough qualifying grants to meet 
their payout quota. Again, in support of the current legal framework, I advocate for a ban 
on private foundation transfers to donor-advised funds. Doing so would close two 
loopholes for private foundations – the ability to anonymize giving, and the ability to 
defer their minimum granting. 
 
Another issue relating to transparency comes from DAFs transferring money to other 
DAFs. Oftentimes donors will open a different DAF account because of an easier 
platform or an affiliation with a particular organization. While this is not illegal, and 
allows for flexibility in the market, it does create some reporting opaqueness. When a 
DAF sponsor returns Schedule D of the Form 990, it only reports the “aggregate value of 
grants.” Right now, that aggregate value includes transfers to other DAF sponsors, 
because they are technically 501(c)(3) organizations. This aggregate value can be 
misleading when trying to determine payout rates and other measures of DAF activity. A 
special report by Giving USA (2018, p. 29) reported that, “From 2012 to 2015, DAF-to-
DAF granting accounted for 4.4 percent of all dollars from donor-advised fund grants.” 
DAFs do report a list of all of their grantees in Schedule I, but it is extremely difficult to 
determine all of the DAF-to-DAF grants. In order to report these grants, there would need 
to be a national registry of DAF sponsors, which is currently lacking, so that DAFs could 
track grants to other DAFs by EIN. Ultimately, such a measure would not affect the 
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philanthropic activity of donors, but bring greater accountability and transparency to this 
unique subset of nonprofits.   
 
3. The Cost Issue. 
 
Smart donors can maximize the tax-advantages of giving by using a donor-advised fund. 
In years when they experience a liquidity event, or realize a capital gain, donors give 
some or all of the appreciated asset to a donor-advised fund. DAFs facilitate the reception 
and liquidation of appreciated assets, including real-estate, closely held business stock, 
and other complex gifts.  In this way, the giver forgoes paying a capital gains tax on the 
appreciation of the asset, but also receives a tax deduction for the fair market value of the 
donated asset. While donations of appreciated assets to most public charities enjoy these 
double benefits, similar gifts to private foundations are not valued at the fair market 
value, but rather at the cost basis, and thus do not maximize the deduction (Andreoni, 
2017).  
 
This differentiation in treatment may seem unfair at first, but important distinctions 
between private foundations and DAFs must be articulated. Donors who use private 
foundations enjoy much more control over their charitable money than donors who give 
through DAFs. Part of the 5% payout for private foundations may be used for 
administrative costs of running the foundations which can be paid to oneself or a family 
member. These administrative expenditures can include travel and other expenses related 
to running the foundation. Distributions from foundations can be directed toward 
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individuals or other causes, as the board of the foundation sees fit, not just grants to 
public charities. By contrast, DAF users cannot pay themselves out of their DAF account 
to administer their philanthropic activities; they cannot use DAF money for travel or 
other personal expenses relating to their giving; and they can only forward their DAF 
money to other qualified 501(c)(3) organizations. Comparing the tax-treatment of private 
foundations to that of DAFs is not comparing apples to apples. 
 
As mentioned before, donating appreciated assets to any public charity enjoys the double 
tax advantage of avoiding capital gains tax and deducting the full market value. Donor-
advised funds merely facilitate the reception of non-cash assets, and allow more 
flexibility for how and when to distribute the charitable donation. Consider a real-estate 
developer who wishes to give some property to charity. Donating an appreciated real-
estate holding that belongs to a family-run LLC may be a fairly complicated gift for a 
small charity to receive, and the donor may not want just one charity to receive the gift. 
The developer can gift the property into a donor-advised fund; the DAF sponsor 
liquidates the assets; and then the donor can make cash grants out of the account to the 
charities of choice whenever he or she decides.  Savvy givers plan ahead and use DAFs 
to bunch giving into one year, taking full advantage of their maximum percentage 
(generally 50 percent) deduction from taxable income, and then take the standard 
deduction in future years as they continue to give out of their DAF. This technique is 
even more salient now with the recent doubling of the standard deduction. While these 
features largely explain why DAFs have become so popular, they also make DAFs more 
expensive for the government to sanction. 
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Donor-advised funds help people maximize the tax-advantages of giving, especially for 
those who have appreciated assets to give away, which generally means the wealthy 
(Andreoni, 2017). From a public policy standpoint these tax advantages for the wealthy 
represent a loss in tax revenues for the government. One question that reform advocates 
have asked is whether or not it is worth it to the public to allow donor-advised funds? 
Andreoni (2017) conducted a benefits and costs analysis of DAF activity, in an attempt to 
answer this question. He found that DAF donors contribute about 15% more appreciated 
assets, compared to high-income donors. He modeled the costs in tax-revenues lost and 
the benefits in increased giving through DAFs. He concluded that DAFs help donors 
minimize taxes more than they increase giving, resulting in a net loss for the public 
sector. These findings offer an important piece of the puzzle for developing policy around 
DAFs, but they do not represent the whole picture of DAF usage. 
 
In his analyses, Andreoni (2017) compared DAF users to high-income (over $500,000) 
itemizers from the Statistics of Income (SOI) data set from the IRS. This comparison was 
based on the average DAF contributions, calculated by aggregated organizational data. 
Heist and Vance-McMullen (2019) found that mean DAF statistics are highly skewed, 
and do not accurately represent the heterogeneity among DAF sponsors. The net losses 
reported by Andreoni may be limited to only the high-income segment of DAF user and 
that segment may be smaller than previously suspected. In 2017, the number of accounts 
jumped by 174,144 in one year. This increase was largely due to a huge influx of 
corporate employees who signed up for donor-advised funds through the online giving 
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platform Benevity.  Ebeling (2018) reported that these donors work for large corporations 
and are generally younger millennial employees. They mostly give out of their 
paychecks, not appreciated assets, and most of these donors do not itemize their 
charitable deductions (Ebeling, 2018). If this growing segment of DAF users do not 
donate appreciated assets and do not itemize their deductions, then this influx of DAF 
donors do not account for any losses in tax revenues. In terms of benefits to nonprofit 
sector and society, future research will need to investigate if and how much such 
platforms increase charitable giving. However, all of these employees work at 
corporations that match employee giving (Ebeling, 2018). Given that we know that 
matches effectively incentivize donors (Karlan & List, 2007; Eckle & Grossman, 2003, 
2008), and assuming that this online platform facilitates the process of giving, which 
reduces the transaction costs (c.f. Huck and Rasul, 2010), then we can assume that such 
workplace giving platforms will increase charitable donations. 
 
Not all regulations for donor-advised funds would affect such workplace givers. For 
example, Andreoni (2017, p. 39) suggested limits on advantages for non-cash assets, or 
“requiring non-cash contributions to DAFs be paired with additional cash contributions.” 
Such measures would attenuate the cost of lost revenues to the IRS by forcing donors to 
liquidate part of an asset and pay capital gains or donate cash from income which can be 
deducted but does not avoid capital gains tax. Colinvaux (2017) identified one of the 
problems of non-cash donations, that the value of the asset can change during the time 
that it goes into the DAF and finally to the grantee. This is especially problematic if the 
asset loses value after being transferred into the DAF, because the donor gets a deduction 
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of the fair market value at the time of donation, which may be more than what the grantee 
ultimately receives. In this case the donor receives a tax break that is not commensurate 
with the benefit to the charity. To moderate this potential unfairness, Colinvaux (2017) 
proposed a net-benefit-to-charity approach of valuing non-cash assets. This approach 
would effectively reduce the tax-advantages for wealthy DAF donors. 
 
The perception of the efficacy of regulating tax deductions for the wealthy largely 
depends on their perceived purpose. In his history of the last 100 years of the tax 
deduction (implemented in 1917), Duquette (2018) explained, “the contribution 
deduction was created to encourage voluntary giving to public purposes by rich 
industrialists who had made their fortunes in business.” The perception of the deduction 
as a way to encourage giving has morphed into a perception of it being an implicit cost 
for government (Duquette, 2018). In regards to donor-advised funds, if the purpose of the 
charitable deduction is a cost to government that should be minimized, then the proposed 
regulations mentioned above would be effective measures. If the purpose of the tax-
deduction rules were to encourage the voluntary, private provision of public goods, then 
such regulations would not be effective because they disincentivize donors by raising the 
price of giving. From the perspective of nonprofit managers and fundraisers, such 
regulations would be seen as disincentivizing major gift prospects. In professional 
fundraising, some of the most vital donations for a nonprofit organization come from 
major gifts and planned gifts which frequently involve the donation of appreciated assets 
(Ciconte & Jacob, 2009; Dove, Spears, & Herbert, 2002; The Fundraising School, 2010). 
DAFs are often used as intermediaries to liquidate such assets. Regulations limiting the 
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ability of donors to utilize appreciated assets to make major gifts and planned gifts would 
be counterproductive to the development of the nonprofit sector.  
 
Evaluating the costs and benefits of DAFs to society and the nonprofit sector is a 
complex and evolving task. While DAFs may decrease tax revenues from the wealthy, 
they may also increase charitable giving among non-itemizers. A central element of this 
question is whether DAFs increase total giving or if donations to DAFs substitute other 
forms of charitable giving, resulting in a zero-sum situation. Rooney (2017) summarily 
evaluated the question and noted that DAFs are not decreasing charitable giving. In 
approaching the substitutes theory, there is a perception that giving in the US has 
remained constant as a percentage of GDP over the past four decades (Perry, 2013). 
However, this is not the case. List (2011) found that, “Charitable giving as a percentage 
of GDP has climbed steadily since the mid-1990s, from roughly 1.5 percent to more than 
2 percent today.” This growth in giving actually aligns historically with the proliferation 
of donor-advised funds. Similarly, Duquette (2018) found that philanthropic giving as a 
percentage of GDP has increased since the early twentieth century, due largely to tax 
deductions for wealthy business owners . More research on donor-advised funds will be 
needed to determine if they increase charitable giving, or if they merely act as substitutes 
for other forms of giving.  
 
Policy Recommendations 
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Given the reasons for concern about the growth of donor-advised funds, reform advocates 
seek to protect public interests from a dramatic change in American philanthropy that is 
not yet fully understood. The history of governing nonprofits sets a precedent for a laisez-
faire approach to regulating charitable activity (Brody, 2006). The commercial aspect of 
much of the DAF growth chafes the publicly-minded reform advocates, who are calling 
for more aggressive treatment of an increasingly popular charitable industry.  
 
Some of the concerns for misconduct and loopholes are obvious, others are much more 
complex and remain under-researched. For those breaches of extant legal structures, 
simple fixes may obviate the few participants who have found the cracks in the system. 
For larger concerns over the nature of donor-advised funds as exempt entities and their 
role in controlling vast amounts of publicly subsidized charitable dollars, the formation of 
new public policies must carefully weigh the ramifications for current and future 
developments in the nonprofit sector. The advent of the donor-advised fund, for better or 
worse, was itself an unintended consequence of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Mindful of 
the concerns of many reform advocates, in an attempt to preserve the public trust for the 
nonprofit sector and to preserve as much freedom of the philanthropic activity of 
Americans, I propose the following policy recommendations: 
1.  Set a life-term for all donor-advised funds and require a remainder 
beneficiary designation. By establishing a maximum payout period of the 
donor’s life, the timing concern is addressed in a way that maintains the 
maximum flexibility for donors, while preventing charitable funds to go 
unused in perpetuity. This policy would effectively treat DAFs as charitable 
	 95	
trusts with no split-interest and the option for earlier distributions. Such a 
provision would not likely interfere with the vast majority of donors who use 
DAFs for more immediate philanthropy, yet would prevent donors from 
carelessly leaving publicly subsidized funds without a plan. 
2. Prohibit Private Foundations from transferring funds to Donor-Advised 
Funds. The most obvious violation of current legislation is the loophole for 
private foundations to transfer money to DAFs either to avoid transparency or 
to meet their minimum payout. Closing this loophole would prevent DAFs 
from being misused as well as clarify their unique functions vis-à-vis private 
foundations. 
3. Mandate Reporting DAF-to-DAF transfers. Right now, it is difficult to 
accurately ascertain how much of a DAF sponsor’s grants are sent directly to 
operating charities and how much are merely transferring money to another 
DAF. This opaqueness can lead to inflated estimates of grantmaking by DAF 
sponsors. Requiring DAFs to distinguish between grants to operating public 
charities versus other DAFs, will provide a higher level of transparency. 
4. Do not limit the deduction for non-cash donations. While DAFs may cost the 
federal government more than other forms of charitable giving in lost tax 
revenues, because donors can use them to maximize current tax-advantages, 
they should not be limited just for the sake of saving the federal government 
money. We still do not fully understand if and how DAFs may increase 
overall charitable activity. Any regulation that increases the price of giving for 
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wealthy donors can frustrate nonprofits’ efforts to secure major, 
transformative donations. 
These four recommendations represent a policy approach that is designed to maintain the 
public trust in the nonprofit sector and maximize the benefit of nonprofits, while 
maintaining the maximum freedom for private citizens to exercise their voluntary desires 
to serve public causes. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
As early as the Elizabethan Charitable Uses Act of 1601, governments have encouraged 
private citizens to donate to public works and other charitable purposes. The United 
States has developed one of the most vibrant and pluralistic voluntary sectors in the 
world. State and Federal governments’ encouragement of charitable giving has been a 
vital element to the flourishing charitable sector in the United States. Government has 
also regulated philanthropic activity to ensure transparency and accountability of private 
citizens who take advantage of the favorable tax rules designed to encourage giving. The 
Tax Reform Act of 1969 singled out private foundations as needing more regulation, 
which increased their accountability to the public, but also had inadvertent consequences 
for the whole nonprofit sector. The propagation of donor-advised funds is one of those 
consequences. Congress has since identified DAFs as a type of nonprofit that required 
more public accountability, and through the Pension Protection Act of 2006 required 
better reporting, but did not alter their financial operations. 
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The rapid growth of donor-advised funds has rightly attracted critical attention from 
reform advocates who have raised insightful concerns about their entry into the charitable 
economy. Some of these concerns deserve immediate correction, while other concerns 
raise rather controversial debates. While all of these concerns are important to debate and 
consider, not all of them merit immediate action. Hundreds of thousands of people are 
now using donor-advised funds, with hundreds of thousands joining every year. The more 
we learn about their activity, the more we recognize the plurality of uses and the 
heterogeneity of their clients. Making changes to the law in order to more tightly regulate 
one segment of DAF users, like high-income itemizers, may inadvertently affect other 
users, like millennial corporate employees, or the even rest of the nonprofit sector. 
 
One of the big questions that needs much more exploration is if and how DAFs increase 
charitable giving. From a behavioral economics perspective, when you decrease the price 
of a product, increase the value of the product, and lower the transactions costs, you 
would expect a much higher consumption of the product. These are the basic underlying 
forces that are driving the growth of DAFs. Tax-advantages lower the price; the timing 
advantages and flexibility increase the value of the philanthropic experience; and the 
handling of complex non-cash assets, as well as the online, easy-to-use platforms 
decrease the transaction costs for charitable giving. By the same rationale, we would 
expect that this cheaper, better, easier form of charitable giving would increase overall 
giving, but we are lacking any conclusive empirical evidence.  
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Some may argue that charitable donations should not be allowed to sit in an account, 
earning interest, while not being used to benefit the public. This matter of timing is 
biased toward the present and is more a matter of personal philosophy about social justice 
than a matter of legal correctness. Various forms of charitable trusts allow donors to defer 
the distribution of their charitable dollars to a later date. The only legal precedent for 
establishing a minimum payout is with private foundations, which regulations are 
designed to allow for perpetuity. In lieu of an allowance for perpetuity with a forced 
payout, I propose a life-term for the existence of a DAF account, essentially treating 
DAFs as an irrevocable planned gift with the flexibility of early distributions. Such a 
treatment would maintain equitable treatment across different forms of exempt entities. 
 
Some flaws in the uses of donor-advised funds are obviously egregious and may easily be 
corrected with simple regulations that would not affect the majority of donors. 
Eliminating transfers from Private Foundations to DAFs would maintain the transparency 
standards established by previous legislation and ensure that DAFs are not being 
misused. More detailed reporting about grants going to other DAFs will also increase the 
transparency in the sector and provide more accurate assessments of how money is 
flowing through DAFs to other charities. 
 
Until we can more fully understand how DAFs augment the nonprofit economy as a 
whole, we must refrain from imposing reactive regulations designed to increase the price 
of giving by the wealthy. In the meantime, more research must be conducted to better 
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understand how DAFs encourage donations to charitable purposes, which is the primary 
purpose of laws governing philanthropy. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The three articles found in this dissertation represent a seminal work in the research of 
donor-advised funds. While the immediate findings of the articles may be the most 
apparent contributions to the various bodies of literature to which they belong as well as 
the fields of nonprofit studies and philanthropic studies in general, what I hope does not 
get overlooked is the importance of multidisciplinary research in these fields and the 
necessity for the convergence of social sciences in understanding the complexities of 
nonprofit entities and philanthropic behavior. Donor-advised funds provide an urgent and 
meaningful impetus for economists, social psychologists, law professors, political 
scientists, public administration professors and the like to come together to wield the 
various perspectives and disciplines in an attempt to improve knowledge and 
understanding about such social phenomena. 
 
Some groundwork has been laid for investigating the underlying behavior economic 
concepts and theories that help to explain why individuals use donor-advised funds and 
how these concepts can help us to understanding how lowering the price of giving and 
increasing agency in giving leads to more donative behavior and high rates of giving. 
One of the critical issues that was attempted in the original experiments but failed, was 
measuring the effect of time on giving decisions. Given that the time is probably the most 
important factor that increases the agency of the donor, more work needs to be done to 
investigate how giving a donor more time to make a giving decision effects the way that 
decision is made. Other features of donor-advised funds also need to be explored. For 
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example, DAFs anonymity is not well understood. How often do donors give 
anonymously through DAFs, why, and how does it affect their giving choices? Other 
features include the ability to involve family in charitable decision making, or the choices 
for investment of DAF assets, or the facilitation of non-cash assets. All of these issues 
present new and exciting topics for research in nonprofit philanthropic studies. They will 
require multidisciplinary approaches involving various techniques and theoretical 
frameworks.  
 
One of the biggest limitations of the dissertation is the lack of data on individual giving 
behavior. Without individual-level data, so many of the most important questions about 
donor-advised funds will go unanswered. The organization data gives us some indications 
about trends and the various uses of DAFs based on differing sizes and types of sponsors, 
but these differentiations are too simple to accurately describe the full population of DAF 
users. Moreover, the heterogeneity of activity among sponsors may only be a reflection 
of the heterogeneity that exists between individual DAF users. If heterogeneity between 
organizations causes us reason for pause in developing policy to regulate DAFs, how 
much more will the heterogeneity among individual DAF users be reason to think 
critically about how public policy will affect the growing population of DAF users.  
 
In order to pursue the critical research needed for understanding individual DAF usage, I 
am currently working to compile samples of deidentified account-level data from a 
representative sample of DAF sponsors. Once such data is available we can begin to 
explore how various demographic factors relate to DAF usage; we can investigate the 
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relationship between investment choices and charitable choices; we can research the 
critical issue of timing in DAF giving, and truly begin to understand the flow of money, 
and the life-cycle of DAF usage.  
One of the main finding of article two was that DAFs are resilient to recession 
economies, but we don’t know by what mechanisms this resilience is manifested. Are 
there only certain types of DAF users that give in the recession, or those who have certain 
levels of assets? DAFs may also be resilient to microeconomic shocks or changes. For 
example, it could be that DAFs allow older Americans to continue or even increase 
charitable giving post-retirement, when their income is diminished and limited. In other 
words, how are DAF used at different stages of life? The bottom line is that we know so 
little about who uses donor, how they use them, and why. For those who conduct research 
in the area of charitable giving, philanthropy, and nonprofit studies, there is much work 
to be done on understanding donor-advised funds. This work will require academics from 
multiple disciplines as well as the collaboration of donor-advised fund sponsors and 
users.  
 
Charitable activity is one of the great mysteries of human behavior. Donor-advised funds 
have given us a twist to how charitable giving is done in America. Unraveling this twist 
allows us insight into the inner-threads of the act of give to others. 
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